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The Newtown Connecticut school attack at the Sandy Hook elementary school on 
December 14, 2012, was another example of the tragedy of mass murder. When a targeted 
attack occurs, the victims must await the arrival of law enforcement personnel to address 
the threat and stop the loss; this “lost time interval” results in extending the duration of a 
targeted attack until police can resist an attacker. In the absence of onsite personnel trained 
to resist an attacker, such as a school resource officer, students and staff are at the mercy 
of an attacker. This thesis asked the question: Can existing resources be leveraged to 
increase available capacities in actively resisting an active shooter in a targeted school 
attack to eliminate or reduce the lost time interval of law enforcement during an attack on 
an American school especially in low resource areas, such as rural and/or isolated 
communities. Case studies were completed to identify opportunities to reduce the loss 
incurred in these attacks with an emphasis on reducing the duration of an incident when 
prevention measures had failed. The value of collaboration and necessity to leverage 
resources in the public safety sector is well researched and critical resources with the 
capacity to operate in an offensive posture are available through planning and 
preparedness. Relationships can be developed between different domains and disciplines 
within a community to create a multidisciplinary environment of safety with the capacity 
to prevent or reduce loss through violence. Through these relationships, a culture can be 
created that combines strategies and tactics for prevention, as well as a response to these 
tragedies. A culture of security can replace vulnerability and result in a greater level of 
confidence in the ability to keep this nation’s schools safer. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of researching targeted school shootings in America was to identify 
common characteristics in these incidents to recognize opportunities to respond more 
rapidly in an effort to reduce loss. School shootings are rare but devastating events, and not 
unlike the attacks of 9/11, this violent phenomenon has been reacted to at varying levels. 
Time is critical in a crisis and just as automatic external defibrillators address the lost time 
interval for emergency medical service response, strategies have been developed and 
proven successful in reducing the consequence of this delay.  
After the attacks of 9/11, commercial airlines responded to the threat of terrorists 
compromising an airplane by implementing a defensive and offensive strategy not only to 
protect the pilots, but to add an active resistance option by arming themselves as well; 
however, the legally mandated safe environment of schools prohibits the same resistance 
opportunity. In an attempt to make American schools safer, a level of vulnerability resulted 
for an attacker to exploit this environment. Relationships can be developed between 
different domains and disciplines within any community to create a multidisciplinary 
environment of safety with the capacity to prevent or reduce violence. Through these 
relationships, a culture can be created that combines strategies and tactics for prevention, 
response, and resistance to these tragedies. 
Training and response strategies can be standardized and practiced through 
scenario-based operations that will familiarize and prepare agencies and individuals for 
response to a school attack when preventive efforts fail. A culture of security can replace 
vulnerability and result in a greater level of confidence in the ability to keep this nation’s 
schools safer. 
Since before the post-9/11 formation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the need to secure and protect American citizens has been a critical priority for the 
nation. Similar to the United States military, the DHS adopted a hierarchical model 
structure that utilizes a top-down manner to operate. This model has been used in many 
reactive or response type situations, such as natural disasters, but the first responders and 
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members of the affected communities are the first to engage in mitigation efforts prior to 
federal assistance. A persistent realism in the face of these disasters is the vigilance and 
courage of American people as they leverage their capabilities in response to these 
incidents. The DHS is a colossal enterprise with many parts and no single entity can be 
prepared for all possible events, which was recognized by the DHS. The value of “home 
town” security was expressed as a necessary element of homeland security in 2010 when 
Janet Napolitano stated, “One of the important lessons that we’ve learned over the years is 
that confronting violence in our communities works best when local law enforcement (LE) 
works in close collaboration with the communities and citizens they serve, as well as their 
partners in the federal government.”1 As the DHS prepares for and defends against terrorist 
attacks, natural disasters, and other large-scale incidents, targeted attacks on American 
schools continue.  
A case study model was used to determine if a more effective method exists to 
respond to targeted school attacks. The Newtown Connecticut school attack at the Sandy 
Hook elementary school on December 14, 20122 was another example of the tragedy that 
is mass murder, and the amplification of the loss when this senseless violence occurs in or 
around a school. Society has an obligation to protect its young and most innocent of 
members, and when an attacker enters a school to impart uncontested, murderous violence 
on children, an active resistance option with immediate response parity can be successful 
in saving lives in the interval from onset to conclusion of the assault. Latency in a LE 
response can be eliminated or reduced, and immediate resistance in some cases to the attack 
can occur with on scene, trained professional responders, either law enforcement or 
civilian, in an effort to save lives and prevent loss. 
The typical reaction to a disaster or terrorist attack is a recovery posture mode, and 
in most cases, a choice does not exist as in the case of a hurricane, flood, or tornado; they 
cannot be stopped or diminished. Rarely do massive storms occur without warning; 
                                                 
1 “Homeland Security Begins with Hometown Security,” August 3, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/blog/ 
2010/08/03/homeland-security-begins-hometown-security. 




however, providing for some level of preparedness to occur. Targeted school attacks are 
typically a surprise when preventative measures fail, but the damage and loss can be 
stopped or reduced through more rapid, dynamic counteraction. 
The peace officer has evolved to an “all hazards” trained, well equipped and 
prepared LE professional. Being trained for “all hazards” does not mean ready for any 
possible scenario, but rather, the ability to respond to any incident by an organized 
approach toward mitigation. Currently, collaboration exists between disciplines in many 
forms: fire drills with local fire departments and schools, school resource officer (SRO) 
placement within schools, safety groups, and emergency medical training, for example. 
The idea of introducing an active resistance option to American schools is not new, but 
remains controversial. Leveraging assets is also not a new strategy, and as citizens 
comprise this nation’s fire and police departments, military, and public health 
organizations, these abilities can and do transcend disciplines. 
A case study approach into past-targeted attacks was used to focus on the lost time 
interval or duration of time for law enforcement to respond and control the situation, which 
is typically when most of the loss occurs. The existing gaps found in the literature and case 
review is the absence of a dedicated security team or response to an attack incident to 
measure success or failure. Although some schools employ a method to actively resist an 
attack, these locations have not experienced such an event to allow for an analysis of the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an active resistance strategy. The case study approach 
is used to analyze past, notable attacks in smaller communities with limited resources in an 
effort to identify an opportunity to resist or respond to an attack prior to LE arrival; 
consequently, curtailing an attacker’s opportunity to do harm. 
The search for an opportunity to suspend or halt an attack occurs ideally as quickly 
as possible to limit or prevent loss, and may be done with on scene personnel prepared and 
trained for such an incident. The details of the case studies are important as they relate to 
the attack duration and the act, omission, or latency of a reaction to the attack to reduce 
loss.  
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This recommendation is NOT a wholesale suggestion to arm school faculty and 
staff nationwide. Rather, the recommendation is the creation of a security team “model,” 
which can be tiered based upon capacity, training, resources, and concisely deployable.  
A policy model can exist to maintain a LE presence in schools, but as more of a 
supervisory role and resource available to the full-time staff assigned the responsibility of 
defending the occupants in the event of a targeted attack. The role of a SRO can evolve to 
that of a supervisor with deputies (sentinels) operating under their supervision, and 
continuing education, training, and direction can be delivered through this single source 
hierarchal relationship. The strategic innovation of this paradigm is that current SROs will 
become teachers and current school staff will become defenders.  
This framework provides for an opportunity for law enforcement and the schools 
to interoperate and train cooperatively to create a culture of seamless response through the 
community in the event of an incident.  
In smaller communities, the ability to combine resources and increase capacities is 
vital as LE resources are very limited. Thus, a LE response to an incident that requires a 
longer lost time interval awaiting outlying resources may be insufficient initially. The 
framework for this policy is the opportunity for faculty and/or staff of schools to participate 
in a strategic program to develop a response team in collaboration with law enforcement 




The Newtown Connecticut school attack at the Sandy Hook elementary school on 
December 14, 20121 was another example of the tragedy that is mass murder, and the 
amplification of the loss when this senseless violence occurs in or around a school. Society 
has an obligation to protect their young and most innocent of members, and when an 
attacker enters a school to impart uncontested, murderous violence on children an active 
resistance option with immediate response parity can be successful in saving lives in the 
interval from onset to conclusion of the assault. Latency in law enforcement (LE) response 
can be eliminated or reduced, and immediate resistance in some cases to the attack can 
occur with on scene, trained professional responders, who are either law enforcement or 
civilian, in an effort to save lives and prevent loss. 
The earliest record of a school shooting incident in the United States (U.S.) was the 
“Pontiac’s Rebellion school massacre on July 26, 1764, where four Lenape American 
Indians entered the schoolhouse near present-day Greencastle, Pennsylvania, shot and 
killed schoolmaster Enoch Brown, and killed nine or ten children (reports vary); only two 
children survived.”2  
History reveals that targeted violence toward a school is not a new trend and 
continues to occur without warning. Reactions and response to these phenomena have been 
varied and controversial with stricter gun control measures meeting resistance throughout 
the nation.  
The prevention of violence is the ideal strategy just like in the fire service; the best 
fire is the one that does not start. Unfortunately, and despite the best efforts of law 
enforcement, school faculty and staff, and communities as a whole, these wanton violent 
acts recur. In the event that prevention fails, and an attack occurs whether planned or 
                                                 
1 “Frustrating Search for Newtown, Conn., Shooter Adam Lanza’s Motive,” December 24, 2012, 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/nation/frustrating-search-for-newtown-conn-shooter-adam-lanzas-
motive/1267513.  
2 Wikipedia, s.v., Enoch Brown School Massacre,” last modified May 5, 2015, https://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Enoch_Brown_school_massacre. 
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random, existing strategies among multi-disciplines, agencies, and vocations may result in 
the ability to react to these vicious assaults cooperatively and immediately.  
A 2006 study conducted by the National Institute of Justice revealed, “95% of 
schools had a comprehensive plan to address crisis preparedness,”3 but the same study 
revealed that “51% of school-based police officers said emergency plans were not 
adequate.”4 
This thesis analyses past incidents of violence to derive data through case studies 
to begin developing strategies and leveraging existing capacities to include non-traditional 
roles for existing personnel to address the “lost time interval” or latency in LE response in 
the event of an attack on any school regardless of size, demographic, or location.  
A. PROBLEM SPACE  
In the past several decades, a series of targeted violent attacks in American schools 
have resulted in many senseless fatalities and casualties of innocent victims. Active shooter 
incidents (ASIs) are rare, brief events that have the capacity to incur many casualties and 
fatalities prior to LE intervention.  
In conjunction with all other safety and security protocols existing in American 
schools, when a targeted attack occurs, the victims must await the notification and 
subsequent response of LE personnel to address the threat and stop the loss; this “lost time 
interval” results in extending the duration of a targeted attack until police arrive on scene. 
In the absence of armed personnel on location at the onset of an attack, such as a school 
resource officer (SRO), students and staff are at the mercy of an attacker. The threat of 
targeted school attacks remains and American schools are extremely vulnerable to this type 
of assault due to the nature of schools being undefended, in the absence of a SRO, and the 
risk of these attacks being multiplied by the lost time interval of LE response.  
Second Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff (2005–2009) stated,  
                                                 
3 Beth Schuster, “Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents in Schools,” National Institute of Justice 
Journal, no. 262 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225765.pdf. 
4 Ibid., 44. 
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when we consider the issue of school safety, we live in a world where both 
overseas and domestically we have to be concerned about the possibility of 
people carrying out acts of violence in our schools, whether driven by 
terrorist motivations or by some kind of personal, psychiatric disabilities. 
The motivations could be varied: driven by terrorism, psychiatric 
disabilities or personal reasons.5 
Smaller, rural communities with large logistic jurisdictions and lower densities of 
peace officers per square mile are especially vulnerable due to longer response times and 
fewer available resources. 
In the United States, “about half of local police departments employed fewer than 
10 sworn personnel, and about three-fourths served a population of less than 10,000.”6 
Currently, no national doctrine, mandate, or policy exist that addresses active resistance to 
an active shooter in a school engaging in targeted violence except by law enforcement.  
To date, a coordinated targeted attack on multiple schools at one time has not 
occurred, but in that instance, LE resources will be predictably out of place and responding 
en masse to the initial call for help.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
What measures, resources, and capacities need to be developed and employed that 
are financially and politically reasonable, realistic, practical, legal, and effective in 
reducing casualties and fatalities in a targeted school attack when preventative efforts fail? 
Can existing resources be leveraged to increase available capacities in actively resisting an 
active shooter in a targeted school attack to eliminate or reduce the lost time interval of law 
enforcement during an attack on an American school especially in low resource areas, such 
as rural and/or isolated communities? 
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
• What active resistance response framework is theoretically ideal? 
                                                 
5 Michael Chertoff, “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at a Securing the 
Schools Initiative Event Remarks at a Securing the Schools Initiative Event,” February 12, 2008, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=483217. 
6 “Local Police,” last revised July 25, 2015, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=71.  
 4 
• What is the deterrent value of public awareness to target hardening of a 
school? 
• What is the balance between school safety, target hardening, and active 
resistance ability while maintaining a safe learning environment for 
American students? 
 5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Targeted attacks on schools can be considered a “black swan”7 event, which is “the 
disproportionate role of high-profile, hard-to-predict, and rare events that are beyond the 
realm of normal expectations in history, science, finance, and technology.”8 Historically, 
the manner in which school attacks would end was very dependent on LE intervention. 
Municipal LE agencies possess a limited amount of resources and funding, and providing 
a SRO from the finite pool of police officers is often not a sustainable option.  
A terrific amount of literature is available specific to the issue of school safety and 
violent behavior recognition, as it pertains to targeted attacks on American schools. Much 
literature is either government reports or psychological perspectives. While the literature 
is comprehensive, some elements and options for maintaining the safety and security of 
American schools were not found, such as strategies for immediate active resistance to an 
attacker.  
The literature clearly covered the history of school shootings in the United States, 
case studies, motives when known and resulting consequences and response to these 
incidents. The literature was lacking in exploring novel approaches toward school safety, 
specifically response strategies to school attacks beyond run, hide, and fight, and funding 
of enhanced security measures. This literature review breaks the literature into four sub-
categories as follows: existing model policies, literature that provides a broader 
perspective, existing research, and further options toward averting or minimizing targeted 
school shootings.  
                                                 




B. MODEL POLICY VERSUS OPTIONAL POLICIES 
The literature reflects the model policies for school shooting prevention and 
response to include the Safe School Initiative (SSI), which was created by the United States 
Secret Service in concert with the United States Department of Education in 2004.  
The SSI is a summary and overview of school shooting incidents that had occurred 
through 2002. It provides data for each sub-component of my research, but does not address 
the “Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,”9 which is a federal law that prohibits the 
possession of a firearm in or around American public, private, or parochial schools; thus, 
ensuring that in the absence of a SRO or armed guard, schools are a guaranteed soft target.  
The Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) prohibits any person from 
knowingly possessing a firearm that has moved in or otherwise affects 
interstate or foreign commerce at a place the individual knows, or has 
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. The GFSZA defines “school 
zone” as: 1) in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; 
or 2) within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial 
or private school.10  
Other examples of model policies include the Blueprint for Violence Prevention 
developed by the United States Justice Department in 2004, which goes into great detail 
regarding prevention model programs, such as Big Brother and Big Sisters,11 and the 
Strengthening Families program.12 The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) released the 
Indicators of School Crime and Safety report in 2009, which specifically details school 
                                                 
9 “In 1990, Congress passed, and the president signed, the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The law 
directs school districts to develop policies to keep students and staff safe from guns and other dangerous 
weapons. Following the successful drug-free zone concept, many local districts have adopted weapon-free 
zones within and around the school. In many cases, zero tolerance policies were developed that direct 
severe sanctions (including expulsion) of students caught with guns or other dangerous weapons.” 
“Strategy: Gun-Free School Zone,” accessed March 7, 2013, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/school-
safety/strategies/strategy-gun-free-school-zones.  
10 “Guns in School Policy Summary,” November 2013, http://smartgunlaws.org/guns-in-schools-
policy-summary/.  
11 “Big Brothers Big Sisters Is the Nation’s Premiere Donor and Volunteer-Supported Youth 
Mentoring Organization,” accessed March 7, 2013, http://www.bbbs.org.  
12 “The Strengthening Families Program (SFP) is a nationally and internationally recognized parenting 
and family strengthening program for high-risk and regular families.” “Welcome,” accessed March 7, 2013, 
www.strengtheningfamiliesprogram.org/.  
 7 
shooting incidents through 2008 with a focus on the framework behind each incident, as 
well as a summary of the effectiveness of existing security measures.  
Federal recommendations do exist for target hardening and increased physical 
security measures13 to resist an attack, and although potentially effective, these measures 
are static, conspicuous, and able to be defeated. 
One policy with little literature immediately available is the “Guardian Plan” in 
place in Harrold, Texas within the Texas public school system,14 which is a blueprint for 
arming school staff.15 The “Guardian Plan” is a four-part strategy, which took over a year 
of planning to implement. The school is remote, which may result in a significant delay in 
LE response; the Guardian Plan was put in place to avoid extended periods of “hiding” 
while awaiting the arrival of law enforcement in an attack.16  
The Harold Independent School District initiated the Guardian Plan in 2007 in 
response to, and because of the Virginia Tech massacre,17 when the school board believed 
“they could do more.”18 “David Thweatt, superintendent for Harrold Independent School 
District in north-central Texas, told ABC News his school board voted unanimously to arm 
school employees after the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, which he says was a wakeup 
call.”19 
                                                 
13 Science and Technology Directorate, Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series Primer to 
Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings (FEMA-428/BIPS-07) 2nd 
ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012).  
14 “For those who are opposed to the idea by insisting that teachers and guns should not be the 
solution, many—like Thweatt—believe that simply telling the public that schools are a “gun free zone” is 
obviously not curbing the activities of persons like Adam Lanza who killed 20 children and six adults in 
Hometown.” Scott Paulson, “Teachers Are Armed with the ‘Guardian Plan’ in Harrold, Texas,” The 
Examiner, accessed March 7, 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/teachers-are-armed-with-the-
guardian-plan-harrold-texas. 
15 “The Guardian Plan, Safety Program, Risk Management Emergency Plans,” October 31, 2007, 
http://www.harroldisd.net/vimages/shared/vnews/stories/4c080dfbee1f9/CKC%20%28LOCAL%29.pdf.  
16 Paulson, “Teachers Are Armed with the ‘Guardian Plan’ in Harrold, Texas.” 
17 “Worst U.S. Shooting Ever Kills 33 on Va. Campus,” accessed March 7, 2012, http://www. 
nbcnews.com/id/18134671/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/worst-us-shooting-ever-kills-va-campus/#. 
VbRigbNVjsY.  
18 Paulson, “Teachers Are Armed with the ‘Guardian Plan’ in Harrold, Texas.” 
19 Ben Waldron, “Texas School District to Arm Teachers,” ABC News, March 27, 2013, http://abc 
news.go.com/US/texas-school-district-arm-teachers/story?id=18823381.  
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The Guardian Plan allows school staff including teachers to carry concealed 
weapons; these personnel are anonymous and known only to the school superintendent and 
school board. An incident has not occurred in the Harrold Independent School District 
since the adoption of the “Guardian Plan.”20  
Regarding the controversy of the Guardian Plan approach, Thweatt states, “The 
idea that we have moved into a society that the police have to do everything is ridiculous, 
Active shooters know where they are going. If your school is known to have a policy in 
place where people are protecting children with deadly force, they are not coming to your 
school.”21  
C. LITERATURE THAT PROVIDES A BROADER PERSPECTIVE 
The literature lends to the perspective that firearms in schools have not been 
explored as an option for a response to a shooting incident or active shooter situation. The 
Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, which was released by the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) in cooperation with the International Association of 
Police Chiefs (IACP), regards “active resistance” in their response recommendations only 
as a last resort in an active shooter situation and suggests “objects of opportunity,”22 such 
as books, desks, and chairs. The use of firearms to respond to a school attacker by other 
than LE personnel is not alluded to, mentioned, or implicated. 
A school attack tragedy occurred on December 14, 2012 in Newtown, Connecticut. 
A male attacker armed with several weapons entered the Sandy Hook elementary school 
and shot 22 children and 6 female staff members. Almost immediately upon this incident’s 
release by the media, the issue of gun control became paramount.  
                                                 
20 Michael Jaccarino, “Stop School Shootings by Letting Teachers Fire Back, Say Texas Officials,” 
Fox News, December 18, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/18/stop-school-shootings-by-letting-
teachers-fire-back-say-texas-officials/. 
21 Ibid. 
22 “Active resistance is fighting back with any objects of opportunity, such as chairs, desk, and books. 
Active resistance is a last resort and should only be used if potential victims are trapped in a room with an 
active shooter, there are already victims, and all other personal survival recommendations are no longer an 
option.” Bureau of Justice Assistance, Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, DC: United Department of Justice, 2007), 24. 
 9 
United States President Barack Obama made mention of meaningful action in his 
preliminary speech on that same day merely hours after the Sandy Hook incident,23 which 
became gun control within the week.24 
The issue of gun control has been controversial, and the leader of the National Rifle 
Association (NRA), W. LaPierre, responded to the Sandy Hook school shooting publicly 
on December 21, 2013 with the following statement, “The only thing that stops a bad guy 
with a gun is a good guy with a gun.” LaPierre opined further, “policies banning guns at 
schools create a place that ‘insane killers’ consider the safest place to inflict maximum 
mayhem with minimum risk.” The NRA is ranked by Congress as one of the most powerful 
lobbying organizations in America.25  
The model policies overwhelming agree that school shootings are brief, and in most 
cases, over before the arrival of law enforcement,26 “Despite prompt law enforcement 
responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement 
intervention.”27 
                                                 
23 “And We’re Going to Have to Come Together and Take Meaningful Action to Prevent More 
Tragedies Like This, Regardless of the Politics,” December 14, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 
2012-12-14/politics/35846745_1_parent-children-transcript.  
24 The U.S. president, Barack Obama puts the issue of gun control center stage by placing his vice-
president, Joe Biden, in charge of a task force to produce concrete proposals on the reform of firearm laws 
within weeks. Obama implored politicians to summon courage on the issue in the wake of the Newtown 
massacre. “Obama Pledges Action on Gun Control Appointing Biden to Lead Task Force-Video,” 
December 19, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/dec/19/obama-action-gun-control-biden-
video.  
25 Walter Hickey, “How the NRA Became the Most Powerful Special Interest in Washington,” 
Business Insider, December 18, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/nra-lobbying-money-national-rifle-
association-washington-2012-12#ixzz3gzRWFSDG. 
26 “Despite prompt LE responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement 
intervention. Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by school administrators, 
educators, and students, or by the attacker stopping on his own.” Center for the Study and Prevention of 
Violence, Targeted School Violence Report (University of Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and 
Prevention of Violence, 2004), http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/factsheets/safeschools/FS-
SC19.pdf. 
27 United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education, The Final Report and 
Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United 
States (Washington, DC: United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education, 2004). 
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“Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by school 
administrators, educators, and students or by the attacker stopping on his own.”28 This fact 
reflects the need for research and an open dialogue in planning for an armed attack on a 
school when preventative efforts and existing policies fail, and the violent ideation of the 
attacker evolves to an actual attack.29 
D. HISTORICAL LITERATURE 
The United States Secret Service, Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, United States Department of Education, and International Association of Police 
Chiefs have researched and delivered comprehensive case studies for all major school 
shootings that have occurred in America through 2011.  
A distinct profile for a school shooter has not been established.30 The profiles of 
the attackers have been researched and determined insignificant in predicting violent 
behavior.31 
As research into past school attacks suggested, no distinct “profile” for a school 
attacker exists. It was determined that the creation of a positive environment of mutual 
respect where students have a bond to responsible adults within the school has proven to 
be an effective deterrent in past potential attacks.32  
                                                 
28 United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education, The Final Report and 
Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United 
States, 26. 
29 Ibid. “Close to half of the incidents were known to last 15 minutes or less from the beginning of the 
shooting to the time the attacker was apprehended, surrendered, or stopped shooting. The fact that most of 
the targeted school violence incidents studied was not stopped by law enforcement appears in a large part to 
be a function of how brief most of these incidents were in duration.” 
30 “Path to Violence,” February 2013, http://www.pbs.org/program/path-to-violence/. 
31 “In reality, accurate profiles for those likely to commit acts of targeted violence do not exist.” 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 18.  
32 “Educators must create an environment in which students feel comfortable telling an adult when 
they feel that someone might do harm to themselves or others. School settings in which teachers and 
administrators pay attention to students’ social and emotional needs, as well as their academic needs, 
support a climate of safety in the school.” Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Targeted 
School Violence Report, 2. 
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The literature reveals that prevention efforts are effective at some level and need to 
be prioritized, improved, and fostered in the future to be successful; 120 school attacks 
were thwarted between 2000 and 2010.33  
“Large amounts of both federal and state monies are spent to support school 
violence programs with little or no data on their potential effectiveness.”34  
With the enactment of The Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, firearms are 
prohibited in or around schools, which guarantees a “soft target, which is a military term 
referring to unarmored/undefended non-military target to potential attackers,”35 as no 
immediate lethal consequence exists in the absence of armed security personnel.  
A correlation was discovered in the literature between high numbers of casualties 
and soft target attacks, such as the Virginia Tech, Sikh temple, Oak Creek, Wisconsin, 
Blacksburg, Virginia, Columbine, Colorado, the Amish school in Pennsylvania, and the 
Craighead County Arkansas attacks.36 In Pearl Mississippi on October 1, 1997, an armed 
attacker named Luke Woodham entered the Pearl high school, killed two students, and 
wounded seven others.  
                                                 
33 “Path to Violence.” 
34 Jaana Juvonen, School Violence: Prevalence, Fears, and Prevention (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP219/index2.html.  
35 Soft Target: “A military term referring to unarmored/undefended non-military target; e.g., a city or 
industrial region targeted for destruction. Soft targets can generally be overcome from any direction with 
typical ordnance in use by line units.” “Soft Target,” accessed March 7, 2013, http://medical-dictionary.the 
freedictionary.com/Soft+Target.  
36 Ann Coulter, “We Know How to Stop School Shootings,” December 19, 2012, http://www.ann 
coulter.com/columns/2012-12-19.html. 
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The rest of Woodham’s plan was to drive to the junior high school to continue the 
rampage.37 When Woodham exited Pearl high school, Vice Principal Joel Myrick retrieved 
a firearm from his vehicle and detained the attacker.38 
The literature reflects further that school staff, in most incidents, are the first 
responders in an attack on a school, and that the crisis management and response 
procedures are dependent on the rapid arrival of law enforcement.39 The existing literature 
included in this review went only as far as active resistance as a last resort with no mention 
of weapons beyond books, chairs, and desks. 
E. EXISTING POLICIES AND RESEARCH 
The literature identified several issues relating to the causes of violent ideation, as 
well as the efforts to prevent targeted violence. Bullying was prevalent in the history of the 
attacker, but not in every case, and the SSI recommends increasing anti-bullying 
programs.40  
In a separate report, bullying to some degree, affects 20–30 percent of American 
students.41 The literature that identifies and recommends prevention programs tend to 
augment each other, and RAND has identified over 200 such programs in existence today, 
which it considers daunting.42 Weapon deterrence plans, such as metal detectors in schools 
                                                 
37 “His (Woodham) plan, authorities subsequently learned, was to drive to nearby Pearl junior high 
school and shoot more kids before police could show up.” Wayne Laugesen, “A Principal and His Gun,” 
Boulder Weekly, October 15, 1999, http://www.davekopel.com/2A/OthWr/principal&gun.htm. 
38 “Myrick and his gun, no matter how one looks at it, saved lives. His actions saved the lives of 
waiting victims at a nearby junior high. He may have kept Woodham from shooting police, who would 
have arrived at the scene disoriented, without Myrick’s home turf frame of reference. Arguably, Myrick 
and his gun even saved the life of the killer, who likely would have killed himself or been shot by special 
weapons attack team (SWAT) cops after spilling more blood.” Laugesen, “A Principal and His Gun.” 
39 “Secure all areas for student and staff safety until the police arrive.” Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 25. 
40 “The prevalence of bullying found in this and other recent studies should strongly support ongoing 
efforts to reduce bullying in American schools.” Bryan Vossekuil et al., The Final Report and Findings of 
the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States 
(Washington, DC: United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education, 2002).  
41 Tonja R. Nansel et al., “Bullying Behaviors Among U.S. Youth: Prevalence and Association with 
Psychosocial Adjustment,” Journal of American Medical Association 285, no. 16 (2001): 2094–2100. 
42 “School-based violence prevention efforts are based on drastically different sets of assumptions 
about what works.” Juvonen, School Violence: Prevalence, Fears, and Prevention. 
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and random searches, were prioritized in most prevention recommendations, but proof that 
they actually deter targeted attacks is unclear.43 Consequence-based programs that result 
in school transfers or discipline were found to increase delinquency, dropout rate, and 
increased violence.44  
Profiling students in an attempt to predict violent behavior was deemed unreliable 
by the SSI,45 and over identifying or labeling may cause bias and stigmatisms that can deter 
future opportunities for profiled students.46  
Armed security was another common recommendation throughout the literature, 
and the majority of schools at all levels did not employ full-time armed security or SROs 
according to a California 2000 Safe School Task Force report.47  
F. FURTHER OPTIONS 
Models, such as the Guardian Plan from Texas, are not represented in the literature, 
and funding of armed security, SROs, and prevention programs was limited.  
The limitedness of literature toward the Guardian Plan may reveal a reluctance 
among media, academia, and federal and state agencies toward considering this option. 
Data is lacking regarding a response toward targeted school violence beyond that of law 
enforcement and a possible reluctance to evaluate the effectiveness of existing programs 
and prevention methods. In a 2001 RAND report, it was determined that many school 
programs related to violence deterrence have been minimally evaluated yet continue to be 
funded with tax monies with little or no data on their effectiveness.48 
                                                 
43 Joe Mathews, “In the Classroom: Metal Detectors and a Search for Peace of Mind,” Los Angeles 
Times, 2001, B2. 
44 Referencing Chavez in Juvonen, School Violence: Prevalence, Fears, and Prevention.  
45 Vossekuil et al., The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the 
Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Bill Lockyer and Delaine Eastin, Safe Schools Task Force, Final Report (California: Attorney 
General and State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 2000), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/ 
pdfs/publications/safeschool.pdf. 
48 Juvonen, School Violence: Prevalence, Fears, and Prevention, 2. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
The literature review revealed an opportunity to combine existing policies for a 
more effective and immediate approach to a targeted school attack. Existing policies, such 
as “run, hide, fight,” are in place, and generally familiar to many American schools. 
Physical target hardening and preventive efforts are well documented as well, and SROs 
and armed civilian staff are addressed in the research as well. What appears to be missing 
is a strategic framework combining existing elements of school safety and resilience in 
reacting and defending against an attacker. 
The majority of existing literature on targeted attacks and active shooters in U.S. 
schools is focused on preventative measures, and little formal literature is available 
regarding active civilian resistance to these attacks. School personnel will likely be the first 
responders in these events by virtue of being on location during the incident, and they are 
not prepared to protect themselves and their pupils if an attacker executes targeted violence 
and a strategic, active resistance policy does not exist. 
A gap has been found in existing policies and research toward targeted school 
violence between prevention prior an attack and post-incident recovery. This “gap” in 
existing data provides for an opportunity to explore non-traditional response strategies to 
these events. 
Through case study research into past-targeted attacks, the lost time interval or 
duration of time for law enforcement to respond and control the situation is typically when 
most of the loss occurs. The search for an opportunity to suspend or halt an attack occurs 
ideally as quickly as possible to limit or prevent loss, and may be done with on-scene 
personnel prepared and trained for such an incident. The details of the case studies are 
important, as it relates to the attack duration and the act, omission, or latency of a reaction 
to the attack to reduce loss.  
The existing gaps found in the literature and case review is the absence of a 
dedicated security team or response to an attack incident to measure success or failure. 
Although many schools employ a method to resist an attack actively, these locations have 
not experienced such an event to allow for an analysis of the effectiveness or 
 15 
ineffectiveness of an active resistance strategy. A case study approach is used to analyze 
past, notable attacks in smaller communities in an effort to identify the opportunity to resist 
or respond to an attack. 
  
 16 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDIES
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the possibility of providing the ability to resist an active shooter 
in a targeted school attack actively. The research assumes the consequences of the “lost 
time interval” between the onset of a targeted attack on a school, the awareness of the attack 
by bystanders, and subsequent response by law enforcement to respond and mitigate the 
incident. Further, the benefits of eliminating this lost time interval is assessed and a 
hypothesis derived using case studies selected to represent a general representation of past 
incidents. The cases were selected to represent all school-level attacks, both student and 
non-student attackers, child and adult attackers. Further, the selected cases received 
widespread media coverage and attention in the United States. The case studies discuss 
each targeted school attack, but vary from one another in attacker age, motivation, 
affiliation with school, weaponry, and final disposition. The objective of the case studies 
is to analyze past incidents to seek evidence that an opportunity to resist an attacker actively 
prior to the arrival of law enforcement existed and a trained response team may have 
reduced the loss from such an attack. 
When comparing cases of school-related violence, the type of incident must be 
determined. The attack motivation typifies the outcome in many cases. Targeted attack 
active shooters typically do not stop until confronted, and typically have limited 
contingency or succession strategies. In other words, when the attacker is neutralized, the 
attack (and loss) stops. 
School attacks are defined initially by the motivation of the attacker, and have 









Rampage shootings are defined as (an attack) that “occurred on a school-related 
public stage before an audience, is committed by a student or former student of the school, 
and involves multiple victims, some chosen for their symbolic significance or targeted at 
random.”50 Rampage killers tend to focus on the institutions they attack. “They want to see 
the token representations of the hated institution die;” thus, the attack is more about the 
institution than the victims.51 The final disposition of rampage killers is unique in that they 
usually surrender peacefully or commit suicide; the Columbine shooting was a rare 
exception.52 Revenge is a common motivation for rampage shooters and they have been 
called “classroom avengers” in the literature.53 Rampage shootings can, and have occurred 
at all levels of education; elementary through universities and tend to draw the most media 
attention. 
2. Mass Murder
Mass murder is generally defined as the murder of three or more victims, occurring 
in one location at approximately the same time, as a single act.54 The motivation for mass 
murder is typically revenge and/or anger.55 The location of the attack for a mass murder 
50 Katherine S. Newman, Rampage, The Social Roots of School Shootings (New York: Basic Books, 
2007), 330. 
51 Katherine Newman and Cybelle Fox, “Repeat Tragedy: Rampage Shootings in American High 
School and College Settings, 2002–2008,” American Behavioral Scientist 52, no. 9 (2001): 1286–1308, 
http://abs.sagepub.com/content/early/2009/03/05/0002764209332546. 
52 Ryan K. Baggett and Pamela A. Collins. “Chapter 1. School Vulnerability Assessments,” in The 
Comprehensive Handbook of School Safety, ed. E. Scott Dunlap (Boca Raton, FL: CRS Press, 2012), 3–16. 
53 James P. McGee and Caren R. DeBernardo, “The Classroom Avenger,” Colby College, 1999, 
http://www.colby.edu/education/courses/ed215/classavenger.pdf. 
54 John M. Klofas, Summary of Research on Mass Murder (Rochester, NY: Center for Public Safety 
Initiatives, 2009), 1. 
55 James Alan Fox and Jack Levin, Overkill: Mass Murder and Serial Killing Exposed (New York: 
Dell, 1996). 
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normally has a symbolic value to the killers and is the source of their anger.56 In 
anger/revenge motivated mass murder, the targets are known to the offender and 
“perceived to have wronged the offender in some way.”57  
3. Terrorist Attack 
An individual or group, using violence as a tool to advance political or ideological 
goals, exact terrorist attacks.58 The most notable case of terrorism against a school is the 
Beslan School Siege in Beslan, Russia that occurred on September 1, 2004. Thirty-two 
armed Chechen rebels took approximately 1,200 people hostage using firearms and bombs. 
Three days later, all but one hostage taker was killed, and 334 innocent victims, of which 
186 were children.59 
4. Targeted Killings 
Targeted attacks differ from rampage shootings in that they target individuals and 
typically not the institution.60 Targeted attacks are normally motivated by revenge for a 
perceived wrong or misdeed committed against the attacker, and specific individuals are 
targeted. Targeted attacks tend to receive much less media attention than rampage 
shootings.61 
5. Government Killings 
Government killings are executed by government agents “using violence in 
response to protests or riots.”62  
                                                 
56 “Frequently, the targeted location is connected to an agency or organization that has some authority 
or control over the offender.” Fox and Levin, Overkill: Mass Murder and Serial Killing Exposed. 
57 Fox and Levin, Overkill: Mass Murder and Serial Killing Exposed. 
58 Muschert, “Research in School Shootings,” 60–80. 
59 “Beslan Masacre Facts,” August 21, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/europe/beslan-
school-siege-fast-facts/.  
60 Muschert, “Research in School Shootings,” 60–80. 
61 Ibid., 64. 
62 Ibid., 60–80. 
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Table 1.   Typology of School Shootings 
Incident Type Perpetrator Motive Exemplary Cases 
Rampage shootings Member or former member, such as 
a student, former student, 
employee, or former employee 
Attack on school or group of 
students selected for 
symbolic significance, often 
to exact revenge on a 
community or to gain power. 
• 1966 Texas Tower shootings 
• 1999 Columbine High School shootings in Littleton, CO 
• 2002 Erfurt Secondary School shooting in Germany 
• 2007 Virginia Tech shootings 
Mass murders Non-member, typically an adult 
perpetrator, who is not a former 
student or employee 
Attack on school institution 
or group of students for 
symbolic significance, often 
to gain power. 
• 1927 Bath School Disaster in Ba, MI 
• 1989 Montréal massacre 
• 1996 Dunblane school massacre in Dunblane, Scotland 
Terrorist attacks Individuals or groups engaging in 
violent acts to advance political or 
ideological goals 
Politically motivated attack 
on school or group of 
students selected for their 
symbolic importance. 
• 1974 Ma’a lot terrorist attack in Ma’a lot, Israel 
• 2004 Beslan terrorist attack in Beslan, Russia 
Targeted shootings Member or former member, such as 
a student, former student, 
employee, or former employee 
Revenge targeted at 
individuals for some real or 
perceived maltreatment. 
• 1992 Tilden High shooting in Chicago, IL 
• 2003 Red Lion shooting in Red Lion, PA 
Government shootings Government agent, such as military 
or police 
Response to student protest 
or riot behavior, often in 
response to a crisis of 
government legitimacy. 
• 1968 shootings at South Carolina State University, 1970 
shootings at Kent State University 
From Glenn W. Muschert, “Research in School Shootings,” Sociology Compass 1, no. 1 (2007): 60–80. 
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The research into historical targeted attacks on schools reveals many similarities in 
response strategies nationwide. The purpose of this research is to determine if a better, safer 
and more efficient way exists to respond immediately to an active shooter situation in a 
school.  
School personnel will typically be the first responders in these events, and they are 
not prepared to protect themselves and their pupils in most cases, if an attacker executes 
targeted violence.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used is case studies of five targeted school attacks on American 
schools in communities with a population of 60,000 or less. “Local police departments 
have an average ratio of 2.5 full time officers per 1,000 residents for populations of 250,000 
or greater.”65 This ratio drops to 1.8 officers per 1,000 residents for populations of 50,000–
99,999 residents.66 Statistically, local police departments not only have fewer sworn 
officers in smaller communities, but the officer to citizen ration is less as well. The finite 
level of LE resources may not allow for the positioning of SROs nor an appropriate 
immediate response to an attack without awaiting additional resources from adjacent 
agencies, which equates to further delay. 
The qualitative data extrapolated from the case studies reflects the disposition of 
the attackers, pre- and post-incident, how the attack was halted, the lost time interval to 
resistance, and likelihood that a “guardian”67 or “sentinel”68 policy could have had a 
                                                 
65 “Police Officer to Population Ratios, Bureau of Justice Statistics Data,” October 1, 2013, http:// 
www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Officer-to-Population-Ratios.pdf.  
66 Ibid. 
67 “In 2007, the Harrold School District in Harrold, Texas adopted a policy called the Guardian Plan. It 
essentially allows teachers who have a concealed handgun license to carry a gun with them to school.” Will 
C. Holden, “Schools Show Interest in Texas Policy Allowing Teachers to Carry Guns,” December 18, 
2012, http://kwgn.com/2012/12/18/schools-show-interest-in-texas-policy-allowing-teachers-to-carry-guns-
3/. 
68 “The ‘Sentinel Plan’ passed by the South Dakota Legislature is a law that allows school districts to 
decide whether to arm school leaders to deter would-be attackers.” “SD Panel Approves Rules for Armed 
School Sentinels,” August 3, 2013, http://www.aberdeennews.com/news/sd-panel-approves-rules-for-
armed-school-sentinels/article_98239b9c-e973-55b6-89f7-c58f162b314a.html.  
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positive influence on the outcome of these incidents. The demographics and population of 
the cases vary, but the LE response was rapid and casualties occurred. 
The modeling is theoretical in part in that it has not been executed nor is it simple 
to do so, but these models are in effect currently used on a very limited basis. Further, 
“unlike historical and quantitative data available on natural disasters, data for manmade 
hazards may be scarce and are largely subjective. This is especially true for threats, which 
are by their very nature volatile and unpredictable.”69  
The case studies include the Sandy Hook Elementary school attack, December 
2012; the Amish School Shooting, October 2006; the Virginia Tech Shooting, April 2007; 
the Pearl Mississippi Shooting, October 1997; and the Santana High School Shooting, 
March 2001.  
The analysis of these cases was organized to reveal lessons-learned, similarities, 
differences, resulting response on a national level, and the creation of policy modeling to 
reduce losses in these incidents moving forward. The cases are reviewed chronologically 
to demonstrate when possible what occurs during the lost time interval between awareness 
and cessation of the attack, which typically occurs after the arrival of law enforcement. 
Due to the lack of supporting data, assumptions are made as to the ability for 
prepared on-location resources to resist an attacker prior to LE arrival. The primary goal 
of the case studies is to determine that if a security team were present could they respond 
and make an appreciable effort in reducing losses in these incidents. 
In none of these cases was a “guardian” type plan in place, but physical target 
hardening measures of varying degrees were implemented, and in some cases, drills and 
policies were in place to defend against an attacker. 
                                                 
69 Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Buildings and 
Infrastructure Protection Series Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and 
School Shootings, 1.12. 
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FEMA determined in the “Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of 
Terrorist Attacks and School Shooting Report”70 that through the investigation by the 
United States Secret Service into the problem of so-called targeted violence in schools that 
the causes and mode of attacks were too unpredictable to be a reliable basis for common 
strategies to reduce the level of threat. In such circumstances, risk management efforts must 
focus on reducing risk by addressing vulnerabilities, through surveillance and detection, 
hardening, or removal of functional and operational design flaws that might reduce the 
success of attempted attacks. “Alternatively, risk can be managed by increasing 
preparedness and response capabilities that reduce the losses and other effects of attacks 
through appropriate protective measures.”71  
  
                                                 
70 Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Buildings and 
Infrastructure Protection Series Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and 
School Shootings. 
71 Ibid., 3.6. To design safe school projects in case of terrorist attacks and school shootings.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
In attempting to classify a better practice option in the response paradigm to these 
violent attacks, a thorough analysis of previous events must be accomplished to determine 
what has worked in the past, what has not succeeded, and where improvement is needed. 
The cases were selected to note the differences and similarities of the physical structures 
of the buildings, security measures in place, and disposition of the attacker upon cessation 
of the incident. Open campuses, which are common in milder climates, can prove difficult 
to fortify due to their configuration.  
Many existing security measures, as revealed in the Sandy Hook massacre, can be 
easily overcome, and in the absence of active and equivalent resistance, these attackers 
were, and as other incidents indicate, may remain undeterred in their assault until resisted, 
subdued, or neutralized.  
The past cases studied are the following. 
• Virginia Polytechnic Shooting, April 16, 2007, Blacksburg, Virginia 
• Amish School Shooting, October 2nd, 2006, Lancaster County, 
Pennsylvania 
• Santana High School Shooting, March 5, 2001, Santee, California 
• Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting, December 14, 2012, Newtown, 
Connecticut 
• Pearl Mississippi Shooting, October 1, 1997, Pearl, Mississippi 
A. DETAILED CASE STUDIES 
“School shootings are complex incidents that need to be broken down, defined, and 
framed to analyze. School shooters do not act on impulse, and in some cases, plan their 
attack for months in advance.”72 These perpetrators are purposeful and strategic in 
preparing for an attack, and are motivated in different ways. This interval between planning 
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and executing an attack provides an opportunity to prevent an incident if the means exist 
to identify warning signs. 
To understand these events, and reduce the anxiety they cause and implement 
effective interventions, it is necessary to understand the causes and reasons they occur.73 
1. Virginia Polytechnic (Virginia Tech) Shooting 
The case study of the Virginia Tech Shooting provides the background of the 
incident and the perpetrator, the institution, and the LE response both prior and during the 
2007 mass shooting incident. The attacker, Seung Hui Cho, was a current Virginia Tech 
student and no clear motive was attributed to this attack. Collaboration between law 
enforcement and the institution is examined, as well as security measures that existed at 
the time of the shooting. The main reference for this case study is the 2009 report to the 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia “Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, Addendum 
to the Report of the Review Panel.”74 
a. Background 
Seung Hui Cho, a student at Virginia Tech College in Blacksburg, Virginia, 
murdered 32 students and injured 17 more on April 16, 2007 during a shooting spree. The 
victims included students and faculty, and the event was comprised of two separate 
shooting incidents. The first of the two incidents occurred at approximately 0715 hours 
when Cho entered the dorm room of a female student, shot, and killed Emily Hilscher.75 
Cho’s second victim, Ryan Clark, was also shot and killed by Cho as he approached 
Emily Hilscher’s room, “the presumption is that he came to investigate, saw Cho, and was 
killed to stop any interference with the shooter and his Identification.”76 Clark was the 
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resident advisor to West Ambler Johnston residence hall, and resided in the room next to 
Ms. Hilscher.77 
Upon hearing the noises from the initial shooting, “a student in a nearby room called 
the Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD) and stated a sound was heard that was 
possibly someone falling out of bed, which had occurred in the past.”78 “The VTPD 
dispatched a police officer and medical team, which was standard protocol based upon the 
information they had received.”79 The LE response was approximately four minutes. The 
initial call was received at 0720 hours and law enforcement arrived outside at 0724 hours. 
When the police officer arrived and saw the scene, assistance was requested. Cho escaped 
and left the scene during this period. Witnesses did not know where he had gone; bloody 
footprints were evident in and out of the dorm room. At 0740 hours, Wendell Flinchum, 
the VTPD chief, was notified of the incident and requested additional resources from the 
Blacksburg Police Department (BPD). Chief Flinchum notified the school administration 
at 0757 hours once he had gathered more information. Police secured the scene and the 
exterior doors remained lock as was typical. Early in the investigation, a female friend of 
Ms. Hilscher arrived and stated that Ms. Hilscher had a boyfriend and he owned and had 
been practicing with a gun. The boyfriend of Ms. Hilscher immediately became a person 
of interest based upon these statements, and law enforcement began searching for him and 
his vehicle.  
This vehicle could not be located on the campus grounds, so the determination was 
made that Hilscher’s boyfriend had left the scene and law enforcement had no other leads.80 
Investigators focused on the initial incident as a domestic violence issue based upon the 
known facts, and considered the incident a “murder-suicide” and then a “domestic 
dispute.”81  
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The president of the university was notified and almost immediately convened the 
emergency policy group.  
The chance that an armed gunman was loose on campus was not shared with the 
policy group nor advice as to what immediate action should be taken according to the 
report. Both the VTPD and BPD were at the scene investigating and relaying information 
via telephone to the emergency policy group. It was not until 0925 hours that a LE 
representative, a police captain, joined the group. A LE representative was not on the 
emergency policy group prior to this incident and law enforcement did not have the ability 
to provide emergency messaging to the campus; the university administration held that 
capability and responsibility.82 A carefully worded alert was ultimately dispatched campus 
wide more than two hours post-incident; the policy group was concerned with panic that 
might have resulted from this message, which had occurred within the past year based on 
erroneous information.83 By the time the alert was sent, many classes had already begun 
and students would not receive the message; as was true for the students at Norris Hall 
where the attacker would strike next. The campus-wide alert that was sent out was the 
extent of the campus-wide response to the double murder that had occurred that morning. 
Classes went on as normal and the campus was not locked down. It should be noted that 
the individual classrooms did not have locks on the doors, but rather, just the exterior doors 
were securable.  
The feasibility of “locking down” a campus of over 35,000 students and faculty 
became an issue and was considered “unfeasible” by most police chiefs consulted post-
incident.84 
At approximately 0930 hours, the boyfriend of Ms. Hilscher was located by located 
police, and after this contact, he was still determined to be a “person of interest” but 
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considered unlikely to be the killer.85 This determination increased the urgency of the 
response to the incident, which resulted in more emergency alerts, but it was too late.86 
After the initial double shooting, Cho returned to his dorm room. He arrived at 0717 
hours based on the time of his “swipe card.” Cho changed his bloody clothing, which he 
left behind in his dorm room, and accessed his university computer at 0725 hours, 
subsequently, wiping out his account. He deleted his emails and removed the hard drive 
from his computer, which he disposed of with his cellular phone. Before 0900 hours, Cho 
was recognized at the Blacksburg post office by a VA tech professor who reported he 
“looked frightened.”87 The package Cho was sending was addressed to NBC and contained 
20 videos on a CD, two letters, and various pictures of himself. “He seemed to be trying to 
look powerful posing with weapons, the ‘avenger’ for the mistreated and downtrodden of 
the world, and even its “savior,” in his words.”88 
b. Second Attack Phase—Norris Hall 
From the Blacksburg post office, it is assumed that Cho proceeded back to the 
campus and entered Norris Hall with a backpack containing his weapons; “two handguns, 
almost 400 rounds of ammunition, most of which were in rapid loading magazines, a knife, 
heavy chains, and a hammer, and was not viewed as a threat to anyone prior to the attack.”89  
Once in Norris Hall, Cho chained each of the three sets of exterior doors used by 
students, which not only prevented escape but would delay response into the area.  
Cho left a note on one door stating that if anyone tried to remove the chains a bomb 
would go off. A faculty member found this note who carried it to the dean’s office on the 
third floor. As the call to police was about to be made, the shooting started in Norris Hall. 
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Students who encountered the chains on the doors also did not report to the police or anyone 
else.90 
Prior to the attack, it was noted that Cho walked around the second floor hallway 
peering into different classrooms, some more than once and it was considered odd to some 
students that someone was lost this late in the semester. When Cho decided to attack, “he 
entered the Advanced Hydrology engineering class of Professor G. V. Loganathan, room 
206, and shot and killed the instructor and continued shooting.”91 The occupants of room 
206 “had little chance to call for help or take cover.”92 “Cho remained silent during this 
initial attack, and of the 13 students present, nine were killed, two injured, and only two 
survived unharmed; no one in room 2006 was able to call the police. Occupants in 
neighboring rooms heard the noise but did not associate it with gunfire.”93  
“One student went into the hallway to investigate and returned to alert the class as 
to what was occurring.”94 The Norris Hall attack began at 0940 hours and it took about one 
minute for nearby occupants to recognize the attack and call 911. 
The initial call to 911 was routed to the Blacksburg police department and received 
at 0941 hours. It took less than a minute to sort out the details of the call and transfer the 
call to the VTPD at 0942 hours.  
In Norris Hall, the occupants attributed the noises to either construction or lab 
experiments. One professor directed his students to continue with their lesson despite the 
noises.  
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As the gunfire continued, “students began to investigate. One student from an 
engineering class was shot and killed as he entered the hallway,”95 which resulted in terror 
as the realization of the shooting became clear. 
Cho left room 206 and entered room 207 where he shot Professor Christopher 
James Bishop and several students who were by the door, and continued shooting students 
as he walked down the aisle. Professor Bishop and four students were killed and six 
students wounded from room 207. One student had attempted to use a podium from the 
classroom to barricade the door but was unsuccessful. In room 211, students tried to use a 
table to barricade the door, but Cho pushed his way in, and shot the professor and again 
continued shooting students as he walked down the aisle silently. In room 205, students 
barricaded the door mostly by keeping their bodies low, and although Cho fired several 
shots through the barricaded door, he did not enter and no one was injured. Cho returned 
to room 207 but two uninjured and two injured students held the door shut by keeping their 
bodies low. Cho opened the door approximately one inch and fired at the door handle about 
five times before leaving again; no one was shot.96 
Cho returned to room 211, and again walked up and down the aisle shooting 
students, some of whom had already been wounded. Room 211 was visited the most by 
Cho, and ultimately, 11 students and the instructor were killed with six others wounded.97 
After the last attack on room 211, Cho attempted to enter room 204, but Professor Liviu 
Librescu held the door closed with his body and yelled for his students to exit through the 
windows.  
Cho fatally shot Professor Librescu through the door. Ten of the 16 students 
escaped out the windows and four students were shot, one fatally.  
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Cho returned to most of the classrooms and systematically shot from the doorway 
and entered the rooms to continue the attack. The victims had little opportunity to hide or 
escape in the classrooms. 
At the time of the attack, the university had no emergency communication system 
in the classrooms; communication was limited to personal cell phones only.98 The duration 
of the second attack was approximately 12 minutes, and continual shooting could be heard 
over the phone on dispatch recordings until the final shot, which was the suicide of the 
shooter.99 In the 12-minute duration of the attack, Cho had “murdered 25 students and 5 
faculty of Virginia Tech at Norris Hall. Another 17 were shot and survived, and 6 were 
injured when they jumped from classroom windows to escape.”100 Cho used firearms in 
this attack, a 9 mm Glock and a .22 caliber Walther, both handguns. At least 174 total 
bullets were fired from these weapons and law enforcement found 17 empty magazines, 
each with a 10- to 15-round capacity, at the scene. Police recovered 203 unfired rounds 
both in loaded magazines and loose bullets. 
The attack ended with Cho committing suicide by a self-inflicted gunshot to the 
head, assumingly because police were closing in on him.101 A further assumption by the 
review panel is the attack likely would have continued considering the amount of 
ammunition remaining had it not been for the quick arrival of police. 
c. Attack Response—Law Enforcement and Victims 
When Cho entered Norris Hall, he chained the exterior doors shut to prohibit or 
deter the escape of victims and access to responders. Each classroom contained a table, 
desk, and a podium that was bolted to the floor. No emergency communication system was 
in existence, nor was a SRO on scene. However, Virginia Tech has its own police 
department, which was on scene actively investigating the earlier double homicide. It is 
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noted that no victims acted irrationally, but each student had to choose how to react to the 
attack. Few options were available to the victims in this attack against an armed gunman 
shooting at point blank range.  
(1) Escape. Students jumped from windows in only one classroom, which was 
19 feet from sill to the lawn below; students who fled by jumping from the window 
survived, injured but alive. Early in the incident, some students attempted to escape by 
running down the hall, but when the attacker shot them, no other attempts were made. Early 
in the incident, some hid in small rooms (offices) with door locks (not classrooms) and 
everyone who took refuge in these secured areas survived. 
(2) Barricade. In four classrooms, students and the instructor attempted to 
barricade the door with the few available items listed previously, but the podium was not 
an option as it was bolted down.  
Some barricades were effective and some were not, but the attacker did attempt to 
defeat the barricade and enter the rooms. Cho pushed against the door and shot through 
some of the barricaded doors, which caused further casualties. The barricaded doors that 
were effective resulted in Cho moving on to another location to continue the attack; 
consequently, reducing the number of victims within the barricaded rooms. 
(3) Playing Dead. Several students fell and “played dead,” some were injured 
and others were not. Playing dead worked for some of the students, but during the attack, 
Cho revisited areas and shot wounded victims again, as was witnessed by the survivors 
who tried to remain still and quiet.102 
(4) LE Response. University police arrived outside of Norris Hall within three 
minutes of 911 receiving the call. The initial response was two VTPD police officers 
followed seconds later by three more from the BPD. The review panel regarded the sub-
three minute police response as extraordinarily fast due to the investigation into the initial 
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double homicide underway nearby. The VTPD and BPD had trained together and were 
familiar with each other, so little delay occurred prior to taking action. The officers relied 
on their active shooter response training and listened to ascertain from where the gunfire 
was coming. Once it was determined that the gunfire was coming from inside Norris Hall, 
the two different weapons used by Cho made different sounds. Thus, the potential for more 
than one shooter was noted and assumed. The five initial police officers attempted to enter 
the building.  
The active shooter policy at the time included officers advancing toward the sound 
of gunfire quickly and deliberately.  
The police officers attempted entry at each of the three exterior entrances, but 
encountered the chains and locks left by the attacker. Attempts to shoot off the padlock on 
the second door were unsuccessful. Police found a fourth entrance at 0950 hours with a 
conventional lock, which had not been secured by the attacker. This lock was defeated with 
a shotgun. It took an estimated five minutes for police to gain entry into the secured 
building.  
The five police officers entered Norris Hall and advanced toward the sound of 
gunfire not knowing exactly where the shooter was or the number of attackers.  
The initial five-person entry team was followed by a second, seven-person (LE) 
entry team.103 Each team ascended the stairs on opposite sides of the building to meet on 
the second floor, which was recalled as “eerily quiet” by police. The shooting had stopped 
at this time, and police went to the top floor still in search of the shooter. Cho, the only 
gunman, had committed suicide and was no longer a threat. He was discovered and 
identified as the shooter by police at 1008 hours with a single gunshot wound to the head 
and two handguns. 
(5) Post Attack. The shooter was not immediately identified and the scene 
evolved to a mass-casualty crime scene. Police officers removed the survivors to the 
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exterior of the building and transported them to awaiting emergency medical providers. It 
was assumed there was more than one shooter, and a police officer on scene recalled that 
given the amount of damage done by one person with handguns, it made it likely other 
shooters were also on location.104 
During the approximately 10-minute attack, one shooter armed with two handguns 
shot 47 students and faculty. Thirty were killed, and the suicide of the attacker brought the 
fatality total to 31, not including the initial double homicide at the West Ambler Johnston 
dorm. When the attack ceased, approximately 75 students and faculty remained in Norris 
Hall and Cho had over 200 rounds of ammunition remaining. 
d. Analysis 
Throughout the research of schools, a persistent theme is easily recognized, which 
is easy access to firearms. Cho Seung-Hui purchased both weapons used in the Virginia 
Tech attack in typical fashion; the first through the Internet and the second from Roanoke 
Firearms in Virginia,105 both retail. The investigation that followed the incident revealed, 
“Cho was not legally authorized to purchase his firearms, but was easily able to do so. Gun 
purchasers in Virginia must qualify to buy a firearm under both federal and state law. 
Federal law disqualified Cho from purchasing or possessing a firearm.”106 Nevertheless, 
Cho did acquire two semi-automatic weapons with no opposition with which he used to 
impart mass murder. A persistent theme in analyzing targeted attacks on schools has been 
the easy access and availability of firearms despite gun control legislation efforts. The 
existing limitations and prohibitions toward gun possession failed in this case. Similarly, 
advanced gun control measures cannot be relied upon to prevent these attacks; 
consequently, creating the need for an active resistance strategy to respond to these 
incidents. 
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A professional relationship existed between the VTPD and the Blacksburg Police 
Department prior to this incident, which resulted in little delay between members from two 
different agencies responding per their active shooter policy together.107  
Several encounters occurred with Cho that led the VTPD to refer Cho for a 
psychological evaluation. Cho had several encounters with women on campus and 
professors, but the psychological evaluation determined that Cho was not a danger to 
himself or others.108  
The case study did not reveal a motive for the first double homicide, but due to that 
incident, several law enforcement personnel were on scene and in the close vicinity when 
the attack began at Norris Hall approximately 2-½ hours later. It is assumed that the initial 
shooting may have been a rehearsal and test of nerves for the later actions, or “he may have 
thought he would create a diversion to draw police away from where his main action would 
later be, though in fact it worked the opposite way”109 Opportunities to disrupt the Virginia 
Tech attack were missed, as Cho’s behavior and conduct went largely unreported. An 
element of a trained security team may have recognized these violent cues and acted to 
disrupt this attack before it occurred. 
If the intention of the shooter was to create a diversion for the attack on Norris Hall, 
it likely worked in the opposite by the police presence and attentiveness that resulted from 
the first double homicide. The investigation revealed that Cho knew none of his victims, 
students, or faculty.110 
The material that Cho delivered to the Blacksburg post office immediately prior to 
the attack at Norris Hall contained pictures and videos of himself. “The pictures showed 
him wielding weapons, showing his preparations for a mass murder, and railing against 
society that had ill-treated him. He seemed to be trying to look powerful posing with 
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weapons, the ‘avenger’ for the mistreated and downtrodden of the world, and even its 
‘savior,’ in his words.”111  
After the initial double homicide, the summary report stated that police focused on 
the boyfriend of the first victim and the broadcasting of an emergency message was 
delayed. The initial suspect was a logical person of interest, but indeed, was not responsible 
and time and resources were needed to clear this person of interest. The initial investigation 
followed a domestic issue theme.  
The university had two policies addressing emergency alerts at the time of the 
attack, and they were inconsistent. A “campus safety plan” and an “emergency 
management plan” existed. The policy group followed the emergency management plan in 
response to this attack, which did not allow police to send an emergency message if 
necessary; only the policy group had access to the system. The VTPD could advise and 
recommend, but could not transmit an emergency alert on its own.  
The “campus safety plan” states, 
At time it may be necessary for “timely warnings” to be issued to the 
university community. “If a crime(s) occur [sic] and notification is 
necessary to warn the University of a potential [sic] dangerous situation then 
the Virginia Tech Police Department should be notified. The police 
department will then prepare a release and the information will be 
disseminated to all students, faculty and staff and to the local community.112 
After Cho chained the doors of Norris Hall shut, he left a note stating a bomb was 
in the building, which was found by a faculty member. The Virginia Tech bomb policy 
requires that the VTPD be immediately notified of a bomb threat of any sort. The faculty 
member gave the bomb threat note to a custodian to deliver to the dean’s office and the 
dean ultimately notified the police.113 
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The analysis of this incident shows a need for greater collaboration between 
agencies to create a stronger preventative barrier regarding the profiling of a potential 
attacker. In the event of an attack, an on-site security team will assume the role of law 
enforcement if it actively resists an attacker. The knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary 
to achieve this role will ideally be provided by the local LE authority having jurisdiction.  
A dedicated security team comprised of on-site personnel will function as a branch 
of law enforcement until its arrival, and possibly beyond, as dictated by policy and 
situation. The success of this system will depend on the effective collaboration among all 
agencies and personnel involved. Through Cho’s writings and behaviors, in hindsight, 
patterns could have been discovered had all incidents been combined and reviewed. The 
psychological evaluation of Cho was done with incomplete information. The university did 
not have a mandatory reporting policy and some interactions with Cho during the years 
leading up to the attack went unreported. A working group comprised of representatives 
from participating agencies, such as police, university, public health, and 
psychological/psychiatric professionals armed with a complete review could take a more 
profound look and see a more accurate global picture of a potential threat. 
The gun laws that existed were ignored or defeated by Cho’s undeterred retail 
purchase of two handguns. The easy access to firearms is often the most common similarity 
in these types of incidents.  
As was stated, federal gun laws should have prohibited Cho from purchasing 
firearms, but the Virginia State laws in effect at the time may have allowed the purchases. 
Regardless, Cho gained possession of two firearms and committed mass murder with these 
weapons.  
The two responding law enforcement agencies first on scene at the Norris Hall 
attack responded quickly to the active shooter situation, and their training prepared them 
at some level for this type of incident. Entry to Norris Hall was impaired and delayed due 
to Cho chaining the exterior doors and locking them from the inside. Attempts by police to 
shoot off the locks were unsuccessful, as the locks were inside and difficult to reach from 
the exterior.  
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This delay caused by secured doors resulted in a slower police response to the active 
shooter; it took approximately five minutes for police to gain entry. It is thought that when 
Cho heard the police shoot the door they ultimately used for entry (which was not chained 
and locked from the inside), he committed suicide, which subsequently stopped the attack. 
Patrol police officers do not carry the necessary tools to breach such an obstacle and the 
strategy of Cho to keep people out was successful for a time. Target “hardening” of a school 
in lock-down mode may potentially delay police response to an active shooter in the same 
manner. Police must be capable of entering to confront an attacker and stop the loss of life. 
A SRO was not on location and the classroom doors had no locks. Virginia Tech also has 
its own police department.  
The disposition of the attacker was self-inflicted death upon the entry of police into 
Norris Hall. However, it will typically be a mystery to responding officers, and 
consequently, result in responders treating everyone as a possible risk until cleared. Any 
intelligence gathered from the incident may prove to be vital and a means of 
communication is very valuable.  
An emergency communication system from the classrooms did not exist and calls 
to 911 were made from inside Norris Hall at great risk to the caller (in some cases, playing 
dead with a cell phone concealed against their ear). Existing security measures consisted 
of emergency plans and locked doors in some areas that required a “key card” for access 
to appropriate individuals. The locked doors were ineffective, as Cho was a current student 
in good standing and possessed an active key. The campus was not placed in lock-down 
mode, classes were not canceled, and pertinent information was not broadcasted in time to 
affect the attack at Norris Hall. Victims who ran were killed in the hall, and several students 
survived who fled out a two-story window but this egress was available on only one side 
of the building.  
Victims who hid in small offices with locked doors survived, but the individual 
classrooms did not afford places to hide. The case study did not reveal any active resistance 
attempts during the attack. 
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The focus of analysis is the duration between the onset of the attack and termination 
of the incident. This specific period is after the determination of the attacker to commit 
mass violence has occurred and an actual attack is underway and identified. The actual 
attack phase is when the life loss occurs and is the period of greatest danger. This period 
represents a functional opportunity to disrupt the attack prior to police arrival if the proper 
preparations have been made.  
In the Virginia Tech attack, this period of active shooting lasted approximately 10 
minutes, and although law enforcement was on location, its ability to confront the attacker 
directly was inhibited by the attacker chaining shut the exterior doors. The specific 
problems with this incident were the obstacles faced by law enforcement and inaccurate 
information sharing. Virginia Tech was a unique case due to the existence of its own LE 
agency on campus. This benefit was nullified by the time lost attempting to enter the 
building through the doors secured by the attacker. An alternative strategy to resist an 
attacker could have been a bona fide security team comprised of non-LE personnel staged 
throughout campus to allow for an opportunity to have defensive personnel in a position to 
react from within the secured facility. The initial LE resources available were likely 
adequate to address the attacker until further resources were allocated and available, but 
they were delayed logistically by the locked doors. The people who responded were 
certified law enforcement, trained and accustomed to working with the local police 
department, but the response process needs to account for “what if” issues, such as the 
doors chained shut.  
The constraints of Virginia Tech compared to the other cases were limited due to 
the amount of resources directly and immediately available to respond to an incident, which 
they did. An opportunity to respond directly and actively from within may have existed 
with a security team or team member pre-positioned within the secured building and 
capable of taking action and neutralizing the threat earlier in the incident to reduce the loss. 
2. Amish School Shooting 
The Amish school shooting (West Nickel Mines) occurred on October 2, 2006 in 
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. The Amish school was a single room structure, 30’ x 
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34’114 in a rural area providing education to students from six- to 13-years-old.115 At 1025 
hours on that day, the 32-year-old father of three, Charles Roberts, enters the unlocked 
school with three guns, two knives, and a bag containing 600 rounds of ammunitions.116 
Fifteen boys, 11 girls, their teacher and three visitors were present at that time, and Roberts, 
displaying a handgun asked, “have you ever seen anything like this.”117 “Roberts was 
apparently preparing for a long siege, because he armed himself with a 9mm semiautomatic 
pistol, a 12-gauge shotgun, and a rifle, along with a bag of about 600 rounds of ammunition, 
two cans of smokeless powder, two knives, and a stun gun on his belt. He also had rolls of 
tape, various tools, and a change of clothes.”118 Roberts also possessed a box containing 
tools, lubricating jelly, and plastic ties in a nylon bag.  
At 1035 hours, Amos Smoker, who witnessed Roberts entering the school, ran to a 
nearby farm and called for help. He was put in contact with the Pennsylvania State Patrol 
(PSP) and reported what he had seen. The Amish school did not have telephones.  
At the time of Smoker’s call to PSP, Roberts freed all the boys and adult women 
from the school, which left 10 girls behind. It has been reported that one of the Amish girls, 
the teacher’s sister, ran from the school and escaped.119  
At 1041 hours, Smoker called 911 again, and asked if police were sent and during 
this call stated, “okay, someone’s coming out,” which it is assumed he was speaking of 
police response.120 At this time, Roberts was barricading the doors with tables and desks 
and covering the windows. At 1044 hours, the first PSP responders arrived on location and 
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relayed to dispatch that the doors were locked, shades pulled, and they could not see inside 
the building. Lancaster County-Wide Communications (LCWC) (911) radioed that as 
many as 26 people may be in the building.121 PSP officers called for more police and EMS 
assistance, which resulted in seven more PSP units, emergency medical services (EMS) 
and fire arriving on location at 1050 hours. The PSP commander decided on a “cautionary 
approach” and ordered PSP units to be careful and stay visible.122 Roberts called the 
LCWC (911) and he stated, “It’s on White Oak Road. I just took, uh, 10 girls hostage, and 
I want everybody off the property, or else, you tell them and that’s it. Right now or they’re 
dead in two seconds;” the dispatcher heard Roberts then tell the Amish girls “I’m going to 
make you pay for my daughter.”123 Roberts had used his cell phone and the LCWC (911) 
now had his number. Police and EMS retreated from the area and staged at a different 
location.  
Police negotiators attempted to contact Roberts verbally and via his cell phone but 
were unsuccessful.  
At 1058 hours, LCWC (911) receives a call from Marie Roberts, the wife of the 
gunman and stated Roberts had called her at approximately 1050 hours (eight minutes 
prior) and stated “he was upset about something that happened 20 years ago and he was 
getting revenge for it.”124 Mrs. Roberts was worried about her husband being suicidal, was 
unaware of his location, and this information gave police a positive identification of the 
shooter.  
At 1103 hours, police heard a rapid succession of gunfire, they moved in by 
breaking a window, and at that moment, Roberts reloads a shotgun and commits suicide. 
Everyone in the school sustained at least one gunshot wound.125 At 1110 hours, a mass 
casualty incident was called by responders, which resulted in LCWC (911) activating its 
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emergency plan, which dispatched 12 ambulances and a mass casualty trailer. The scene 
was declared safe upon the suicide of the shooter, and ultimately, 10 Amish girls were shot, 
five fatally, and the shooter was killed by a self-inflicted gunshot wound upon police 
entering the building. 
The motive for this case is said to be revenge for an event that happened 20 years 
prior according to suicide notes left behind at his home.126 The West Nickel Mines School 
was torn down on October 12, 2006 to be rebuilt in a different location and named New 
Hope School on April 2, 2007. 
a. Lessons Learned 
In the Amish school shooting incident, an adult with no affiliation to the school 
carried out the attack targeted at females. Since Amish schools traditionally do not have 
telephones, law enforcement might experience a potential communication delay.  
The attacker had planned this event, which was evident through the suicide notes 
left behind, and the supplies he brought to the site.  
The assailant calculated this attack, which he considered a suicide mission. The 
category of this incident is mass murder since the attacker had no affiliation with the school, 
but it has a targeted element since the killer focused the attack only on the females. Family 
and friends of the attacker state they noticed little or no alarming behavior or personality 
changes. Thus, predicting this event might have been impossible. The attacker committed 
suicide upon being confronted by police. (See Appendix B for the suicide note with 
handwriting analysis) 
b. Attack Response 
When Roberts drove onto the Amish school property and exited his vehicle, it 
caught the attention of Amos Smoker to the extent Mr. Smoker reacted by calling 911 and 
relayed what he had seen. This cognitive awareness toward a potential threat started the 
response paradigm quickly. Considering that no telephones were on the property, the “see 
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something, say something” reaction by Smoker was expedient and a proactive response to 
the upcoming attack. Considering the suicide note left behind by Roberts (Appendix B), 
and the tools, materials, and weapons he possessed upon entering the school, left little 
doubt of his violent intentions. These facts would be unknown to police until later into the 
investigation and post-incident. Police response to the incident was between three and six 
minutes based upon the 911 transcripts. Smoker first called 911 at 1035 hours, and officers 
were dispatched at 1038 hours. It is assumed he saw police arriving on scene at 1041 hours.  
The 911 records reflect the first report from arriving officers occurred at 1044 
hours, or nine minutes after the initial call to 911. (See Appendix C, Amish School 
Shooting Timeline) 
Police encountered secured doors and covered windows at the school, but many 
witnesses were present who were either in the building upon initial entry of the attacker or 
bystanders made aware of the situation by these witnesses.  
In this incident, an opportunity existed to obtain actionable intelligence regarding 
the attacker, resources, victims, and events prior to the arrival of law enforcement. The PSP 
commander decided on a “cautionary approach” and ordered PSP units to be careful and 
stay visible, and no active shooting was occurring upon initial response by police. Police 
did not take an offensive posture to the attack until shots were fired according to the reports. 
This shooting occurred at 1103 hours, which was 19 minutes after the initial police arrival, 
and 28 minutes after the initial call to 911 by Smoker. Reports indicate that Roberts entered 
the Amish school at 1025 hours. Everyone inside the school sustained a gunshot wound. 
c. Escape 
Once the attacker entered the Amish school armed, and had seized control of the 
occupants, several people were released. The boys and adults were freed, and the Amish 
girls who remained had their legs bound and stood facing a chalkboard defenseless. At that 
point in the incident, escape seems impossible from the small, one room structure. This 
case was unique among the other cases studied in that the attacker not only targeted a 
school, but only the girls inside and released the occupants who did not match this profile. 
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d. Barricade 
The Amish school building did have locks on the doors and actually was not 
indefensible. 
Contrary to some information in the media, describing the Amish schools as 
“vulnerable” when confronted with an eventual intrusion because they are built in open, 
isolated areas and have no door locks, the West Nickel Mines School was built in the 
middle of a large-gated schoolyard, had a porch with double front doors, and a single door. 
One front door had a high security key locking deadbolt and the other had a push bar 
mechanism.  
“The school (a 30-by-34 foot room) did not have a telephone line, and the day of 
the shooting, all the doors were unlocked and the schoolyard gate was open. Twenty-six 
children (11 girls and 15 boys), Emma Mae Zook, the 20-year-old teacher, her mother, and 
some female visitors, were in the school on the day of the shooting.”127  
Target hardening was possible had the threat been forewarn or known, but similarly 
to other targeted school attacks, it was a surprise and unexpected. With the inability to lock 
out a potential threat, securing in place, or barricading within the single room dwelling, 
was not an option once the attacker entered. 
No civilian response or resistance toward the attacker occurred beyond Smoker 
calling 911. The Amish school did not have a SRO or guard. It is notable that it would 
seem untoward considering the Amish culture of being strictly non-violent, closely 
connected, and peaceful. Amish culture adheres to four principle core values: simplicity, 
humility, forgiveness, and non-violence.128  
e. Post Attack 
Police had identified the attacker prior to the time the shooting within the school 
began. Once police heard gunfire, they entered the building through a window and 
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witnessed Roberts commit suicide, but not before shooting each of the 10 young hostages. 
At that point, the scene was secured and became a mass casualty incident. A robust 
emergency medical services and fire response ensued but five victims were fatally 
wounded with five injured. The case analysis revealed that once Roberts began shooting, 
it was in rapid succession and without warning. At that time, police took an offensive 
posture and entered the building, but the assault was over. The only weapon fired was that 
of the shooter. Police did not return fire, as the attacker sustained a fatal self-inflicted 
gunshot wound to the head. 
f. Analysis 
The Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990 covers public, private, and parochial 
schools, and 1,000 feet around any school, and mandates that gun possession in these areas 
is prohibited. Roberts ignored this federal law and committed an attack on the Amish 
school that targeted school-age girls. The motive for this attack is reported to be revenge, 
and based upon the suicide note left behind, and items he brought to the Amish school, 
deterrence of this attack seems unlikely.  
Had the school been secured, the attacker could have been delayed while police 
responded, which would have been atypical for the Amish school. The gate to the 
schoolyard was open and doors unlocked; again, typical for this school. It is reported that 
Roberts selected his target due to its proximity (nearby) and perceived “softness” of the 
target. “He was angry with life; he was angry at God,” Colonel Miller said. “It appears he 
chose this school because it was close to his home, it had the female victims he was looking 
for, and it probably seemed easier to get into than some bigger school.”129 
“It appears he chose this school because it was close to his home, it had the female 
victims he was looking for, and it probably seemed easier to get into than some bigger 
school.”130 Similarly to the Virginia Tech attack, police were on location at the time of the 
shooting. Dissimilarly to the Virginia Tech incident, police were in a defensive or stand by 
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position when the assault began and not actively pursuing the attacker. A primary criticism 
of the 1999 Columbine attack was that police held back while awaiting special operations 
or a SWAT team arrival to engage the attacker. Since the Columbine attack, a response 
delay is not the preferred response to an active shooter, but rather an immediate response 
by first arriving officers is now preferred. This response posture has been adopted mainly 
to reduce delays in active resistance to an attacker. No active resistance occurred by civilian 
or law enforcement prior to the shooting at the Amish school. 
The focus of analysis is the duration between the onset of the attack and termination 
of the incident. This specific period is after the determination of the attacker to commit 
mass violence has occurred and an actual attack is underway and identified. The actual 
attack phase is when the life loss occurs and is the period of greatest danger. This period 
represents a functional opportunity to disrupt the attack prior to police arrival if the proper 
preparations have been made. In the Amish school attack, this period of active shooting 
occurred in rapid succession, and although law enforcement were on location, its ability to 
confront the attacker directly was inhibited by the attacker securing the exterior doors. The 
specific problem with this incident was the obstacles faced by law enforcement and the 
hostages inside the secured school.  
The Amish school is located in a very small district with limited resources and 
complicated by a targeted attack masked by a hostage situation. LE response was rapid and 
no shots had been fired until approximately 30 minutes after the original call to 911, and 
well after police were on scene. An alternative strategy to resist an attacker could have 
been a bona fide non-LE security team or individual to allow an opportunity for defensive 
personnel or individual to be in a position to react from within the secured facility. The 
initial LE resources available were likely adequate to address the attacker until further 
resources were allocated and available, but they were delayed logistically by the secured 
structure. The initial responders were certified law enforcement, but the response process 
needs to account for “what if” issues, such as secured doors and windows, and a hostage 
situation. The constraints of the Amish incident include limited resources and a culture of 
non-violence. An opportunity to respond directly and actively from within may have 
existed with a security team or team member pre-positioned within the secured building 
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and capable of taking action and neutralizing the threat earlier in the incident to reduce the 
loss. This opportunity is likely impractical due to the culture of the Amish and the bizarre 
attack motivation.  
3. The Santana High School Shooting 
On March 5, 2001, in Santee, California, 15-year-old Charles Andrew Williams 
entered his school with his father’s pistol and 40 bullets, which he used to kill two students 
and wound 13 more victims.131 In a 2010 interview, Williams admitted that it was a 
“suicide by cop” plan meant to “send a message to bullies,” had no predetermined targets 
and surrendered to law enforcement after changing his mind.132  
William’s background included frequent drug and alcohol use and being bullied.133 
He said, “They punched and kicked him, stole his possessions, even sprayed his pant legs 
with lighter fluid and set him afire. Beating up on him was fun and easy.”134  
His schoolwork deteriorated, and Williams began skipping school. Williams also 
claimed, in a 2013 interview, that the live-in boyfriend of his friend sexually abused him 
and he became suicidal.135 Williams had threatened to shoot a teacher to his friends, and 
they encouraged him. Together, they planned out an attack, and told as many as 50 other 
people about their plan.136 Williams states he was afraid of the ridicule if he backed out. 
The attack began in a men’s restroom where he loaded the gun and began firing. 
He retreated to that same bathroom three times to reload and continue the attack.  
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When he stepped out of the stall, he shot two students. Williams also shot the SRO 
three times when he entered the bathroom. On the fourth trip to the bathroom, law 
enforcement entered and Williams “calmly surrendered.”137 
a. Shooting Response 
Williams initiated the attack from a bathroom from which he would step out, fire, 
and retreat to reload. A SRO responded to the incident and was shot three times and 
wounded. At the time of the incident, an off-duty police officer called for backup. When 
police arrived on scene, the shooter calmly surrendered with a full pistol and hammer 
cocked. 
The Santana High School shooting is unique in that the attacker did not perish at 
the scene, which allowed for an analysis into the motivation and thought process of the 
attacker. A single, small caliber handgun was used in this attack, and many people were 
aware of a school shooting plan being created. When people aware of this plot were asked 
why they did not speak up, they dismissed the threat and talk of a plan as “idle talk by 
kids.”138 The attacker also did not actively hunt out targets; rather, he stepped from the 
bathroom, fired, and retreated. 
b. Analysis 
This attack could have been prevented had the threats been shared with adults 
willing to act. A culture of trust between students and faculty creates an environment more 
conducive to sharing this information.139 Further, the awareness through education that 
threats must be taken seriously might have saved lives. The development of an environment 
intolerant of bullying is necessary, as this culture of safety creates “shame free zones.”140  
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The progression from pre-contemplation through termination on the “stage of 
changes model”141 may have been rapid, but in this incident, many people were aware of 
the threat to the point of saying their farewells to the attacker prior to the incident and 
actually seeing the weapon. Santana High School did have a SRO on location who did 
respond to the attack, but was wounded and incapacitated. Once the SRO layer of 
protection was defeated, awaiting the arrival of law enforcement was the next opportunity 
to resist the attacker. With the SRO wounded, and no other level of active resistance prior 
to the arrival of police, the attacker could continue to shoot and retreat into the bathroom, 
which he did until police arrived on location and secured the scene. 
The focus of analysis is the duration between the onset of the attack and termination 
of the incident. This specific period is after the determination of the attacker to commit 
mass violence has occurred and an actual attack is underway and identified. The actual 
attack phase is when the life loss occurs and it is also the period of greatest danger. This 
period represents a functional opportunity to disrupt the attack prior to police arrival if the 
proper preparations have been made.  
In the Santana High School shooting, the specific problem was the shooter would 
fire and retreat to the bathroom as a place of refuge. A SRO was on location who did 
respond, and was shot and wounded. With the incapacitation of the SRO, the next option 
was to await the arrival of law enforcement to confront the shooter. The ability to confront 
the attacker directly was inhibited by the attacker retreating to the bathroom, whereupon, 
the SRO was shot upon entering the bathroom. Santana is a high school with a SRO who 
did respond. An alternative strategy to resist an attacker could have been a bona fide 
security team comprised of non-law LE personnel staged throughout campus that would 
allow for an opportunity to have defensive personnel in a position to react from within the 
secured facility. The initial response by the SRO was ineffective, as he was wounded and 
the initial LE resources available were adequate to address the attacker who surrendered 
upon their arrival. The second responders were certified law enforcement, and the response 
process needs to account for “what if” issues, such as retreating to a place of refuge between 
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attack phases. The constraints of the Santana attack compared to the other cases were that 
a SRO was available to respond directly and immediately to an incident, which he did. An 
opportunity to respond directly and actively from within may have existed with a security 
team or team member pre-positioned within the secured building and capable of taking 
action and neutralizing the threat earlier in the incident to reduce the loss either at the onset 
of the attack, after the SRO was wounded, or prior to the arrival of law enforcement. 
Unique to the Santana case, if the attacker was restricted to the bathroom, and the area 
cleared, the opportunity for the attacker to harm anyone else would be eliminated. 
4. The Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting 
On December 14, 2012, in Newtown, Connecticut, 20-year-old Adam Lanza 
entered the Sandy Hook elementary school with several weapons immediately after killing 
his mother in their home.142 The attacker shot through the glass doors of the school with a 
Bush Master semi-automatic assault rifle and was confronted by two faculty members 
whom he murdered. The principal and school psychologist, were also fatally wounded 
during this initial phase of the attack.143 Lanza murdered 20 children between the ages of 
six and seven years, and six adult faculty and staff members, and when Lanza realized two 
police officers had spotted him, he committed suicide.144  
At 0930 hours, the doors to the Sandy Hook elementary school were locked, which 
resulted in entry into the school by buzzer only. At 0934 hours, the first shots, 
approximately 15, were heard by a visiting parent and reported.145 The perpetrator, Adam 
Lanza, entered the school with a semi-automatic rifle, two semi-automatic handguns, and 
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police recovered a shotgun in Lanza’s car.146 Police discovered over 500 bullets, 301 
rounds of ammunition for the assault rifle, and 206 rounds for the handguns during their 
investigation. The shooter possessed 20 magazines for the weapons upon entering the 
school.147  
All weapons and ammunition were purchased legally by the perpetrator’s mother 
who also had a valid firearms permit, but the attacker did not.148 
The first call to 911 occurred at 0935:39 hours, which originated from the nurse’s 
office after the shooter had left.149 The first 911 call to the Connecticut State Patrol (CSP) 
centralized dispatch occurred at 0935:43 hours. The Newton police dispatched a shooting 
at Sandy Hook elementary school (SHES) at 9:36:06, and further details that entry was 
made through the front of the school followed at 09:36:48, while police were enroute.150 
Further information broadcast from the Newton dispatch included the front glass broken 
out (cause unknown) and continual gunshots heard. CSP officers were dispatched at 
09:37:38. The call was made for “all cars” and stated an active shooter incident was 
underway at SHES.151 Tactical communications occurred between responding officers 
enroute prior to their arrival in preparation to respond once on location. SHES was placed 
in “lock down” mode at 09:38:50 according to CSP radio transcripts, and initial police 
arrived on location at 0939 hours. Gunfire is audible at this same time.152 The sounds of 
gunfire ceased at 09:39:40, and a final, single gunshot is heard at 09:40:03, which is 
believed to be the self-inflicted gunshot wound of Lanza. The suspect, Lanza, was located 
by CSP at 9:51:31, at which time they did not have an identity and police were continually 
searching the school to rule out additional shooters and search for victims and survivors.153  
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It was reported that Lanza had chosen Sandy Hook elementary school as his target 
for two factors, “it was an easy target with the largest cluster of people.”154 Lanza was 
considered a loner, left no note, and reports do not indicate he shared an attack “plan” with 
anyone.155 
Local law enforcement received the first 911 call at 0935 hours and Connecticut 
state police at 0941. According to a transcript of police radio traffic, police arrived on scene 
less than four minutes after the initial call to 911, and Lanza committed suicide within five 
minutes of the first 911 call being received. Police entered the school less than six minutes 
after their arrival on scene.156 Police fired no weapons during the Sandy Hook attack. (See 
Appendix D for the Sandy Hook shooting timeline)  
a. Lessons Learned 
The ability to lock down a school can be overcome through gunfire or using a 
vehicle to defeat locked doors. When an attacker is within a locked-down building, a 
disadvantage is created for law enforcement to force entry or wait to be allowed in, which 
causes a greater delay for engaging the attacker. The lock-down layer of protection was 
defeated and did not prevent the attacker entry into the school, but the ability to lock down 
other areas within the school can buy time and provide protection for students and faculty. 
The Sandy Hook school had magnetic locks on the front door that required someone inside 
the structure to push a button to unlock the door. These doors open freely from the inside 
and the area is under video surveillance.  
b. Attack Response 
An alert parent recognized the incident and 911 was alerted very early into the 
incident, but after the attack was underway.  
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Police responded within four minutes and entered the school several minutes later 
to confront the shooter. A SRO was not on location and the attacker committed suicide 
prior to any encounter with police. Upon entering the structure, the death of the attacker 
and unawareness of the number of attackers complicates response to the incident, as police 
are unaware of who is a threat and how many perpetrators are involved. The cessation of 
gunfire does not mean the attack is over; consequently, it can make it more difficult for 
police to locate the attacker that results in police maintaining an offensive posture until the 
threat is neutralized. Local and Connecticut state police resources responded to the Sandy 
Hook shooting quickly and took action immediately; however, the carnage ceased almost 
simultaneously with the arrival of law enforcement, leaving 26 fatalities. 
The school was evacuated and the attack was centered on one area of the school 
that allowed adjacent areas to escape. Sandy Hook is an elementary school and the student 
victims were all very young; six- to seven–years-old. The shooter killed teachers who 
attempted to protect the children, and active resistance did not occur throughout the 
incident. 
c. Analysis 
The Sandy Hook shooting was recognized early into the incident and reported to 
police through a call to 911. Inside the office where the shooter entered, the victims had 
little time to react and the doors were locked as per protocol. 
Lanza shot through the glass doors to gain entry, defeated this security feature of 
the building, and immediately began shooting innocent victims.  
Some occupants hiding in the office went unnoticed by Lanza and survived, while 
many escaped and the entire incident was over in minutes. The devastation that occurred 
in this brief attack was catastrophic and went uncontested until police arrived on location.  
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No conclusive motive was found for why Lanza attacked the school.157 His 
intentions were pre-planned based upon the murder of his mother and the weapons he 
brought to that location while dressed in military clothing.158 
The focus of analysis is the duration between the onset of the attack and termination 
of the incident. This specific period is after the determination of the attacker to commit 
mass violence has occurred and an actual attack is underway and identified. The actual 
attack phase is when the life loss occurs and the period of greatest danger. This period 
represents a functional opportunity to disrupt the attack prior to police arrival if the proper 
preparations have been made. In the Sandy Hook attack, this period of active shooting 
lasted approximately five minutes, and no security personnel were on location. It should 
be noted that this school is an elementary school. The specific problem with this incident 
was the inability to resist the attacker once he entered the school. The attacker did not make 
an effort to secure the building, who also defeated the physical security measures.  
Once access was made to the victims, no barriers remained to protect them. An 
alternative strategy to resist an attacker could have been a bona fide security team 
comprised of non-LE personnel staged throughout the school to allow for an opportunity 
to have defensive personnel in a position to react from within the secured facility. The 
initial available LE resources were likely adequate to address the attacker until further 
resources were allocated and available, but they arrived after the loss of 26 innocent 
victims. The initial responders were certified law enforcement, but the lost time interval 
for travel and response allowed for wanton access to the victims by the attacker. The 
constraints of Sandy Hook are different compared to other cases, such as Virginia Tech, 
since it is an elementary school.  
The amount of resources available to respond to this incident may be adequate to 
stop an attack, but the time lost during identification, dispatch, and response directly relates 
to lost lives. An opportunity to respond directly and actively from within may have existed 
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with a security team or team member pre-positioned within the secured building and 
capable of taking action and neutralizing the threat earlier in the incident to reduce the loss. 
5. The Pearl Mississippi Shooting 
On October 1, 1997, in Pearl, Mississippi (population 22,000), 16-year-old student 
Luke Woodham entered Pearl high school with a .30-.30 rifle, which he retrieved from an 
unlocked closet. Shortly before 8 am, Woodham began shooting at his fellow students, and 
killed two and wounded seven. The duration of this attack was 11 minutes.  
Methodically he began moving through the commons, shooting his victims 
as students and teachers hid or fled screaming. One of those hit was Lydia 
Dew, 17, killed with a bullet in the back. He was so cool and calm. I saw 
him shoot a kid, and he ejected the shell, says assistant principal Joel 
Myrick. He was walking along, thumbing fresh rounds into the side port of 
the rifle. As swiftly and inexplicably as it began, the rampage was over. 
Woodham turned and headed back outside while Myrick, 36, a commander 
in the Army reserves, sprinted to his own truck and retrieved the .45 
automatic he kept there. Spotting Woodham near the parking lot, he shouted 
for him to stop. Instead, Woodham got into his car and tried to drive away, 
but he lost control and came to a stop as Myrick raced up to him. I could 
see him sitting there, holding on to the steering wheel, his knuckles white, 
those glasses on him, recalls Myrick. Putting the muzzle of his handgun to 
Woodham’s neck, he ordered him out and held him until police arrived. I 
kept asking him why, why, why, says Myrick. He said, ‘Mr. Myrick, the 
world has wronged me. Later, when authorities went to Woodham’s home, 
they found his mother, Mary Ann Woodham, 50, dead. She had been 
repeatedly stabbed with a knife.159  
a. Attack Response 
Prior to LE arrival, Mr. Myrick apprehended the attacker at gunpoint and held him 
until police arrived. It was discovered later that the attacker planned to drive to Pearl 
Middle School to continue the attack before police arrived. The attacker was arrested, tried, 
and convicted for murder. 
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b. Analysis 
The attacker murdered his mother and then drove to Pearl high school, entered with 
a loaded rifle, and began shooting unabated by existing security measures. The attacker left 
the school in his vehicle where he encountered assistant principal Myrick who was armed 
with a pistol he had retrieved from his personal vehicle during the incident. Woodham 
encountered no active resistance until Myrick caught him in the parking lot at which time 
Woodham immediately surrendered. Law enforcement discovered later that the plan was 
to continue the attack at a separate location, but with the cessation of the incident by 
Myrick’s encounter with the attacker, the loss stopped at that point as well. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
“During an active shooter incident, you are dealing with a very brutal equation: 
Time taken by first responders equals casualties.”160 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly all American schools have a policy prohibiting the use or possession of 
firearms on school property.161 Despite this prohibition of weapons, access to firearms is 
necessary for attackers to carry out their plans. “Sheley and Wright found that half of the 
students they surveyed thought obtaining a gun would not be difficult.”162 The United 
States Secret Service, Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States 
Department of Education, and International Association of Police Chiefs have researched 
and delivered comprehensive case studies for school shootings that have occurred in 
America through 2011. A school shooter has no distinct profile,163 and the profiles of the 
attackers have been researched and determined insignificant in predicting violent 
behavior.164 To understand how these attackers evolve through the path to violence, a 
sociologic framework can be used to explain and capture the different phases experienced 
prior to executing an attack. The “stages of change model” in Table 2 explains the path 
from thoughts of revenge to termination of an attack.165 
 
                                                 
160 Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi, “Etiology of School Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-
impulsive Model for Social Work Practice,” 636; John Pirro, “Newtown Police Response to Shooting under 
Review,” The News-Times, July 7, 2013, http://www.newstimes.com/local/article/Newtown-police-
response-to-shooting-under-review-4650757.php. 
161 Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi, “Etiology of School Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-
impulsive Model for Social Work Practice.” 
162 Ibid., 637. 
163 “Path to Violence.” 
164 In reality, accurate profiles for those likely to commit acts of targeted violence do not exist. Bureau 
of Justice Assistance, Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 18. 
165 Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi, “Etiology of School Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-
impulsive Model for Social Work Practice,” 639. 
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Table 2.   Applying the Stages-of-Change Model to Youth at Risk of 
Committing a School Shooting 
 
From Philip Mongan, Schnavia Smith-Hatcher, and Tina Maschi. “Etiology of School 
Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-impulsive Model for Social Work Practice.” Journal 
of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 19, no. 5 (2009): 639. 
“By applying the stages of change model to school shootings, it becomes possible 
to understand how a student can become an instrument of tragedy,”166 and although it 
remains impossible to profile potential attackers, this model can be used toward preventing 
would-be attackers if they are disrupted prior to the termination stage. 
Mongan maintains that movement through the stages is fluid and may progress or 
regress depending on the individual and circumstances.  
                                                 
166 Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi, “Etiology of School Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-
impulsive Model for Social Work Practice,” 639. 
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B. ATTACK STAGES 
1. Pre-contemplation Stage 
The pre-contemplation stage occurs when most students do not have any specific 
plans or goals of violence. It is the starting point or baseline for the evolution to violence. 
2. Contemplation Stage 
When students feel that they have been treated unjustly or wronged, and begin 
thinking about revenge, they have entered the contemplation stage.  
It is “virtually impossible” to identify a school shooter at this stage.167 The key to 
the contemplation stage is a desire for revenge or to right a wrong. In this stage, an attack 
is not being planned, but rather, an evolution to that stage occurs. 
3. Preparation Stage 
Attack planning begins in the preparation stage and is the point at which most 
school shootings are thwarted.168 The preparation phase is delicate since the reality of 
murder is a struggle for most students. Potential attackers voice their plans in this stage that 
can be intercepted if these grievances and ideas are recognized. Another indicator is a 
fascination with other incidents and attackers. The end of the preparation stage marks the 
time when intervention rarely works. 
4. Action Stage 
The action stage marks the point of no return as intervention at or beyond this stage 
is rarely successful. Attack planning and preparation occurs at this stage, and weapons are 
acquired, as well as items deemed necessary for the attack. Students tend to withdraw at 
this stage, but do leave hints about their plans.  
                                                 
167 Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi, “Etiology of School Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-
impulsive Model for Social Work Practice.” 
168 Ibid. 
 62 
5. Maintenance Stage 
In the maintenance stage, the plan is set and the date of the attack determined. 
Weapons and necessary items for the attack have been obtained, and the attacker is waiting 
for the time to come to review the plan throughout this time.  
It is the time when the student becomes introverted and withdraws from family and 
friends, and seemingly has two personalities.  
In this stage, the student is capable of attacking at any point, and threats-
joking or serious-may be directed toward an individual or the school. Any 
threat made must be taken with the utmost seriousness.169  
6. Termination Stage 
“A student reaches termination when one of two things occurs. The student 
completes the attack, which ends in suicide or police-assisted suicide about half of the time. 
Otherwise, they are caught before the attack and put into jail or a mental health facility,” 
according to Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi.170  
The stages between maintenance and termination are the most deadly interval in 
this violent progression. This period marks a commitment to murder, and with that 
commitment, the act becomes justified in their mind.  
Targeted school violence continues to occur despite preventative efforts and 
options exist currently that have the ability to eliminate or greatly reduce the lost time 
interval of LE response to these incidents. The targeted school violence problem must be 
redefined prior to preventative efforts failing and an attack occurring. One problem in the 
event of an active attack is the time lost awaiting law enforcement, which is time used by 
the attacker to kill innocent victims. Strategic imagination is necessary to resist actively 
these attacks immediately, and before the arrival of law enforcement, which thus reducing 
lives lost. 
                                                 
169 Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi, “Etiology of School Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-
impulsive Model for Social Work Practice.” 
170 Ibid., 642. 
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Active shooter incidents in American schools are generally over prior to law 
enforcement arrival due to this delay in notification and response coupled with the 
awareness that schools remain soft targets throughout the nation.  
Once an attacker reaches the termination phase, and an attack is underway, typically 
active resistance or the threat of an active response posture is necessary for the attack and 
consequential loss to cease. 
LE agencies face an infinite number of scenarios and incidents that they must be 
prepared to mitigate and manage effectively and lawfully. It is impossible to have a plan 
for every possible situation, as well as developing a protocol for any potential scenario. 
Public safety professionals must depend on their individual and collective knowledge, 
skills, and abilities to solve problems, mitigate risk, and minimize loss. However, when the 
potential exists to create a plan or model to address a high risk/low frequency event, such 
as a targeted attack on a school, it is worth exploring. 
No “one size fits all” security policy exists for every educational facility in the 
nation, but options are available if the desire, discipline, and courage are present to explore 
these options. As the nation focuses on terrorism, it is necessary to remain vigilant in 
protecting Americans from attacks and indigenous attackers, as the results and 
consequences of these events are equally devastating. To increase response capacity and 
efficiency in a targeted attack, collaboration and cooperation across jurisdictional and 
vocational boundaries is necessary.  
The creation of a “mega-community”171 is an option to bring the response profile 
of law enforcement and civilian security teams together. Mega-communities are 
communities or groups of people brought together to achieve common objectives 
collectively. Gerencser states, “It’s essential to form a new degree of connectedness among 
components and a new set of mechanisms to manage those connections. Mega-community 
                                                 
171 Mark Gerencser and Christopher Kelly, “Mega-Communities; The Next Big Idea,” Federal 
Computer Week, April 16, 2009. 
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members must develop of a new set of institutional capabilities that foster coordination, 
understanding and education.”172 
A culture of security over vulnerability can be created if personnel are on school 
grounds as bona fide members of an integral security team, vetted, and trained to resist a 
targeted attacker actively. In this event, the “soft target” perception should change. Schools 
throughout America already employ staff with backgrounds in the military, law 
enforcement, or other vocations familiar with the function and responsibilities of 
possessing and using a weapon for defense. In the event staff with previous training in 
firearms and defense tactics are not available, these skills can be taught to volunteers who 
fit the criteria established by the authority having jurisdiction. Currently, the State of 
Nebraska has introduced a Legislative Bill (LB 184), which will amend state law to 
eliminate the prohibition of weapon possession by security personnel while in and around 
private schools. (See Appendix E) 
C. CURRENT RESPONSE PROTOCOLS 
A widely known developed strategy is called “run, hide, fight.” The United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identifies the following concepts as “good 
practices for coping with an active shooter situation.”173 
• Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers 
• Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit 
• If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door 
• If you are in a hallway, get into a room and secure the door 
• As a last resort, attempt to take the active shooter down. When the shooter 
is at close range and you cannot flee, your chance of survival is much greater 
if you try to incapacitate him/her 
• Call 911 when it is safe to do so174 
                                                 
172 Ibid. 
173 Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter, How to Respond (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
174 Ibid. 
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Another response protocol gaining attention throughout the United States is the 
“standard response protocol” created by the “I love u guys” foundation.175 
“The ‘I love u guys’ foundation was created to restore and protect the joy of youth 
through educational programs and positive actions in collaboration with families, schools, 
communities, organizations, and government entities.”176  
The following standard response protocol was created to respond to a variety of 
scenarios including school shootings, and uses plain, easily understandable language: 
• Lockout is the following directive: “Secure the perimeter” and is the 
protocol used to safeguard students and staff within the building. 
• Lockdown is followed by “locks, lights and out of sight,” and is the protocol 
used to secure individual rooms and keep students quiet and in place. 
• Evacuate is always followed by a location, and is used to move students and 
staff from one location to a different location in or out of the building. 
• Shelter is always followed by a type and method, and is the protocol for 
group and self-protection. 
South Dakota has taken its response options one step further with the “sentinel” 
program. “Under the rules, the so-called school sentinels will undergo at least 80 hours of 
training in firearms proficiency, use of force, legal issues, first aid and weapons retention 
and storage.”177  
“Only those approved by a school board and local law enforcement officials could 
be trained to have guns in schools. Officials have said the fee charged to school districts 
for the initial 80-hour course is expected to be $700.”178  
“To retain qualifications, sentinels would have to complete another eight hours of 
training each year.”179 The initial and persistent costs could be reduced or deferred through 
a cooperative agreement with local law enforcement. 
                                                 
175 “Student Safety, The Standard Response Protocol,” 2012, http://www.iloveuguys.org/srp.html. 
176 Ibid. 




The “Guardian Plan” (Appendix A) is a school safety policy that was approved for 
use on October 31, 2007 to address a targeted school attack response. The Harrold 
Independent School District is a small (<150 students) single building school located 
rurally.180  
The Guardian Plan was developed and adopted in 2007 to “address concerns about 
effective and timely response to emergency situations at schools, including invasion of the 
schools by an armed outsider, hostage situations, students who are armed and posing a 
direct threat of physical harm to themselves or others, and similar circumstances.”181 
Harrold school district superintendent David Thweatt stated in a 2008 interview, 
“We have a lock-down situation, we have cameras, but the question we had to answer is, 
‘What if somebody gets in? What are we going to do?” he said. “It’s just common 
sense.”182  
D. MODES 
Public safety professionals and first responders cannot be everywhere for all 
instances, and this reality is a persistent obstacle when managing risks versus objectives, 
and budgetary constraints. As in business, public safety strategy seeks faster, smarter, and 
more efficient models to protect the public and reduce loss. Leveraging assets and 
resources to increase outcomes through synergy is not a new phenomenon in public safety; 
however, the most widely known school security strategy is the introduction of a police 
officer as a SRO. Through the case study review, certain modes of LE response and attacker 
behaviors were identified and analyzed as follows: pre-incident preparation, collaboration, 
communication, training, and response. 
                                                 
180 Jessica Rinaldi, “Texas School District to Let Teachers Carry Guns,” Reuters, August 15, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/15/us-texas-guns-idUSN1538661720080815. 
181 “The Guardian Plan, Safety Program, Risk Management Emergency Plans.” 
182 Rinaldi, “Texas School District to Let Teachers Carry Guns.” 
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1. Pre-incident Preparation Is Necessary for Effective Planning 
Since inception, the DHS has sought better practices in the on-going effort to 
protect America. Public safety agencies train, plan, and prepare for emergencies as integral 
elements of the vocation, and preparation stems from planning. From the beginning, the 
DHS recognized the opportunity to leverage existing resources. “It’s a simple idea, but a 
powerful one: that homeland security begins with hometown security. And when we equip 
local law enforcement, citizens, and communities to understand and combat violent 
extremism, we make our home towns—and our nation—safer.”183 This “leveraging” of 
resources philosophy is not new, yet still encounters obstacles that result in failure many 
times if not supported by agency directors and decision makers. This activity is routine in 
equivalent vocations through the use of mutual aid commitments and inter local 
agreements, but is not as widely practiced in many areas when disciplines are dissimilar.  
Many variables occur between agency size, capability, and function. During routine 
response or “high frequency, low risk”184 responses, a logistic push situation exists in 
which necessary resources in adequate amounts are sent to mitigate an incident. As incident 
size and complexity increases, it is typical for even large agencies to experience a logistic 
“pull” situation in which resources are not immediately available. In this situation, pre-
planning based upon the assumption of necessary or adequate resources being available 
may result in plan failure. When resources are pulled from only one pool, they are quickly 
delayed if not exhausted. Preparation for complex incidents prior to an event eliminates 
confusion and panic through familiarization with available capabilities, resources, and 
functions of necessary agencies and disciplines. 
                                                 
183 “Homeland Security Begins with Hometown Security,” August 3, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/blog/ 
2010/08/03/homeland-security-begins-hometown-security.  
184 Gordon Graham, “High Risk, Low Frequency,” Security, August 13, 2012, http://www.security 
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The pre-planning phase of incident mitigation was identified as a priority by the 
DHS from the beginning, and the Incident Management System (IMS)185 was the answer 
to managing complex, multi-disciplinary events. Consequently, all “persons involved with 
emergency planning, response or recovery efforts”186 were directed to become certified in 
IMS. 
In the cases studied, the IMS had little influence on the cessation of the incidents 
and operations on-scene; however, the IMS is a valuable tool in pre-planning and 
preparation for these incidents. At the onset of an attack when resources are mobilized near 
and far, the capabilities and response tactics used are anticipated by all responders through 
planning, preparation, and training to the extent these attacks have occurred. 
2. Collaboration and Interorganizational Network 
The law enforcement profession has evolved from the cop walking a beat to an “all 
hazards”187 trained, well equipped, and prepared law enforcement professional. Being 
trained for “all hazards” does not mean ready for any possible scenario, but rather, the 
ability to respond to any incident by an organized approach toward mitigation. Currently, 
collaboration occurs between disciplines in many forms: fire drills with local fire 
departments and schools, SRO placement within schools, safety groups, and emergency 
medical training, for example. Collaboration at an active response or cohesive team level 
did not exist in any cases studied. The concept of an integral school security team needs 
                                                 
185 “The ICS is a standardized on-scene incident management concept designed specifically to allow 
responders to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and demands of any 
single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.” Department of 
Labor, OSHA, “What Is an Incident Command System,” October 4, 2014, https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/ 
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186 FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, “IS100,” last modified July 21, 2015, https://training. 
fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-100.b. 
187 B. Wayne Blanchard, Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, 
Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance & Legislation: A Tutorial on Emergency Management, 
Broadly Defined, Past, Present, and Future (Washington, DC: FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, 
2007). All-Hazards Approach: “Emergency management must be able to respond to natural and manmade 
hazards, homeland security-related incidents, and other emergencies that may threaten the safety and well-
being of citizens and communities. An all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness encourages 
effective and consistent response to any disaster or emergency, regardless of the cause.” FEMA, FY2006 
Emergency Management Program Guidance and Application Kit (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2005), 6. 
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further study to prove or disprove its value; Virginia Tech had its own police department 
that reduced response time, but this deduction was negated by the fortification of the 
building by the attacker. In the case of Virginia Tech, which has its own police department, 
the department functions as the de facto law enforcement and active resistance responders 
to such an event. The collaboration that occurred was primarily between the local law 
enforcement and the Virginia Tech police department as it related to operations. 
The process of collaboration is working together to achieve common objectives, or 
“teamwork.” Synergy is the sought after by product of collaboration and leveraging 
resources that already exist. An opportunity arises to tap the skills and abilities of 
individuals already in place at these scenes. 
The concept of “inter organizational network”188 is appropriate in this case because 
“many government agencies in these policy areas are simply unable to accomplish their 
goals unilaterally, either because they do not exercise complete authority over the policy 
area or because they lack important resources.”189  
Of all the research done on active shooters and school attacks, and considering the 
response enhancements and modification by law enforcement resulting from the 
Columbine, CO attack, victims must still await the arrival of help once notified of the 
incident. This persistent delay of active resistance to an attacker cannot be overcome with 
LE resources only without the introduction of a SRO in every school, which in itself will 
require collaboration. 
3. Communication Vernacular between Law Enforcement and Civilians  
The ability and means to communicate is critical for an inter-organizational strategy 
to resist a targeted attack. The inherent differences in culture and vocation between law 
enforcement and educators will need to be overcome with a common, objective specific 
vernacular. The concept of an onsite bona fide security team does not require the entire 
                                                 
188 Rachel Fleishman, “To Participate or Not to Participate? Incentives and Obstacles for 
Collaboration,” in The Collaborative Public Manager: New Ideas for the Twenty-first Century, ed. 
Rosemary O’Leary and Lisa B. Bingham (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 31–52. 
189 William L. Waugh Jr. and Gregory Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency 
Management,” Public Administration Review 66, no. s1 (2006): 131–140. 
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peace officer curriculum be mastered, but only those elements critical to the performance 
and knowledge requirements necessary for the established strategies and procedures. One 
necessary skill will be communication as it pertains to the operation, while the other is 
strategic in nature. While collaborating and training, the ability to communicate specific 
roles and objectives is critical to fulfilling the mission.  
In a tactical situation, the ability to communicate will need to be mastered through 
training, familiarization, and interagency drills. 
As strategies are created, and objectives clearly defined regarding the scope of a 
response teams’ role, operational communication will initially be between local team 
members until the arrival of police, at which time, miscommunication can have fatal 
consequences. The possibility of miscommunication must be addressed in any response 
protocol. 
• How to communicate (radio/voice/other) 
• Within security team 
• With outside LE agencies 
• Actionable intelligence 
• What to communicate and to whom 
• Upon deployment 
• Situation status 
• Threat neutralized or not (attacker disposition) 
• Transition to law enforcement 
• Specific roles of onsite team once law enforcement is on scene 
• Safety considerations 
• All other necessary communications as determined through planning 
Effective communications are predicated on familiarization through practice. A 
training regime must include a communication element and continual practice will be 
necessary to master this skill. 
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4. Training Requirements for Effective and Safe Response Posture  
As detailed in the stages of change model, attackers plan their attack, and what 
always comes as a surprise to victims, responders, and everyone affected is a planned out 
event for the attacker. The element of surprise is a major advantage to the attacker and 
creates delays for the responders, who are tasked with being ready at all times to answer 
the call.  
Immediately prior to becoming certified, civilians were trained to be police officers. 
Likewise, the ability to obtain the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to perform 
specific LE roles exists among people of all vocations. As police officers become skilled 
at teaching recruits, other vocations can be trained to perform some essential functions of 
law enforcement. To enlist civilians to integrate with local law enforcement for creating an 
active resistance security team is but one approach to respond to the heinous event of a 
targeted school attack. To require these team members to resist an attacker actively 
assumes a tremendous amount of liability, which must be weighed against the liability of 
awaiting law enforcement only as an active resistance strategy. Extensive training is 
necessary to achieve the necessary competencies to resist an assailant actively and 
aggressive continuing education will be critical. Training must be performed 
collaboratively and integrally toward achieving an extremely high performance level and 
not in a manner to reduce liability or go through the motions; teams must be mission 
focused and dedicated. If the commitment toward the intensity, requirements (time and 
money) and support of this endeavor does not exist, it cannot work and the model is too 
dangerous to not support wholly. An effective way of reducing liability is through proper 
training, preparation, and practice to include reality-based scenarios.  
E. SUMMARY 
This framework provides for an opportunity for law enforcement and schools to 
interoperate and train cooperatively to create a culture of seamless response through the 
community (mega-community)190 in the event of an incident. In smaller communities, the 
                                                 
190 Gerencser and Kelly, “Mega-Communities; The Next Big Idea.”  
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ability to combine resources and increase capacities is vital, as LE resources are limited. 
Thus, LE response to an incident may be insufficient initially that requires a longer lost 
time interval awaiting outlying resources. The framework for this policy is the opportunity 
for current faculty and/or staff of schools to participate in a defender type program and/or 
become a member of a security team. Once thoroughly vetted, including background 
checks, drug and alcohol screening, physical and psychological exams, they will begin the 
program. This program can be led by local law enforcement under the oversight of the local 
district attorney (where applicable) or the authority having jurisdiction. The participants 
may be considered deputies while in and around their local schools, and be assigned an 
SRO which, after initial training and certification, can manage several schools as needed 
instead of remaining static for eight hours as a security guard. Training will be stringent 
and recurrent, and include drills with all participating responders, political entities, and 
representatives.  
Based upon the research, a multilayered approach is the best practice for addressing 
school shootings. A combination of target hardening, prevention, response protocols for 
students and staff, and thoroughly trained on-sight guardians offers a well-rounded 
approach to maximizing safety and actively resisting the attacker until law enforcement 
arrives.  
“Preventing access to dedicated and committed attackers in most cases requires a 
level of security similar to a military installation, which is not feasible for most school 
settings.”191 
The data shows that “in the 20 years between 1989 and 2009, 41 shooting incidents 
in grade schools nationally left 75 dead and 154 injured.”192 The creation and 
implementation of an integral security team capable of actively responding to an attack was 
not found in the case studies. Therefore, the effect of this strategy could not be analyzed 
based on past incidents. 
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The result of this research reveals that a layer of school security is missing in the 
event of an active shooter attack. Filling this gap will create a better, safer, and more 
efficient way to respond immediately to an active shooter situation in a school.  
The threat of targeted school attacks persists and American schools are extremely 
vulnerable to this type of assault due to the nature of schools being undefended, in the 
absence of a SRO, and the risk or number of casualties from these attacks being multiplied 
by the lost time interval of LE response.  
Smaller, rural communities with large logistic jurisdictions and lower densities of 
peace officers per square mile are especially vulnerable due to longer response times and 
fewer available resources, which was a primary motivator for the creation and adoption of 
the Harrold School District’s “Guardian Plan” in Texas. Currently, no national doctrine, 
mandate, or policy exist that addresses active resistance to an active shooter in a school 
engaging in targeted violence except by law enforcement. To date, a coordinated targeted 
attack on multiple schools at one time has not occurred, but in that instance, LE resources 
will presumably be predictably out of place and responding en mass to the initial call for 
help. 
The United States Secret Service, Department of Justice, BJA, United States 
Department of Education and International Association of Police Chiefs, have researched 
and delivered comprehensive case studies for most major school shootings that have 
occurred in America through 2011.  
This research revealed no distinct profile for a school shooter exists,193 and the 
profiles of the attackers have been researched and determined insignificant in predicting 
violent behavior.194 One of the difficulties in preventing targeted school attacks is 
“predicting violence is like predicting hurricanes; the conditions may be perfect, yet a 
hurricane does not develop; further, it is difficult exactly when violence will occur.”195 
                                                 
193 “Path to Violence.”  
194 In reality, accurate profiles for those likely to commit acts of targeted violence do not exist. Bureau 
of Justice Assistance, Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 18.  
195 “Path to Violence.” 
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Past U.S. school shooters have shared some characteristics, but not with enough similarities 
to develop any distinctive profile, researchers say.196  
The inability to profile and identify an attacker prior to an incident reveals the need 
to bolster the defensive ability to respond actively in the event of an attack. 
The “Guardian Plan” is a four-part strategy that took over a year of planning to 
implement. The school is remote, which may result in a significant delay in LE response. 
The Guardian Plan was put in place to avoid extended periods of “hiding” while awaiting 
the arrival of law enforcement in an attack.197  
The Harold Independent School District initiated the Guardian Plan in 2007 in 
response to and because of the Virginia Tech massacre,198 when the school board believed 
“they could do more.”199  
The Columbine attack revealed the need for quicker entry by LE personnel to 
neutralize the threat and stop the loss more quickly.200  
Post-Columbine law enforcement protocols have addressed the issue of awaiting 
the arrival of “special entry teams,” and now any arriving officer in varying team sizes, 
depending on jurisdiction, will enter and actively address the shooter.  
Run, hide, or fight and the standard response protocol are good examples of easily 
understood policies for all involved to respond in an effort to reduce casualties. The “lost 
time interval” for LE response is difficult to reduce or eliminate within the existing system 
of school patrols. In the event a uniformed police officer or SRO are on location, only one 
resource is available to engage an attacker, but the officer is easily identified as a threat to 
the attacker, usually alone, and typically not on location at all times of school and school 
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function operation. The run, hide, or fight model is dependent on the arrival of law 
enforcement to eliminate the threat, and in the absence of an active response plan, the delay 
of LE response equals lives lost to an attacker.  
F. CONCLUSION 
School shootings are rare but devastating events, and not unlike the attacks of 9/11, 
this violent phenomenon has been responded to at varying levels. Time is critical in a crisis, 
and just as automatic external defibrillators address the lost time interval for emergency 
medical service response, successful strategies have been developed to eliminate this delay.  
After the attacks of 9/11, commercial airlines responded to the threat of terrorists 
taking over a plane by implementing a defensive and offensive strategy not only to protect 
the pilots, but to add an active resistance option by arming themselves as well. The history 
of fire codes as well are based many times on lessons learned from tragic events.  
The corollary can be made between causation and effect with regard to how 
tragedies are responded to after the fact to prevent or limit consequences in the future. 
Response protocols have been developed in response to the school shooter threat, 
but little change has occurred with regard to the time lost awaiting law enforcement arrival 
and intervention.  
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VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis addressed the original research questions: what measures, resources, and 
capacities need to be developed and employed that are financially and politically 
reasonable, realistic, practical, legal, and effective in reducing casualties and fatalities in a 
targeted school attack? Can existing resources be leveraged to increase available capacities 
in actively resisting an active shooter in a targeted school attack to eliminate or reduce the 
lost time interval of law enforcement during an attack on an American school? 
B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
• What active resistance response framework is theoretically ideal? 
• What is the deterrent value of public awareness to target hardening of a 
school? 
• What is the balance between school safety, target hardening, and active 
resistance ability while maintaining a safe learning environment for 
American students? 
Attacks on American schools are very rare yet continue to be calculated, deadly, 
and in many cases, strategically planned tragedies. The case studies reveal that once an 
attacker evolves through the “stages of change” model to termination, it is extremely 
difficult to prevent the incident.201  
C. FINDINGS 
Many advances have been made in both target hardening and LE response to a 
school attack, but the lost time interval for LE response is a reality that is difficult to 
overcome in the absence of an on scene security provider.  
As demonstrated in Chapter V, problems and tragedies that have occurred in other 
domains have been addressed through comprehensive strategies, training, and awareness. 
                                                 
201 Mongan, Smith-Hatcher, and Maschi, “Etiology of School Shootings: Utilizing a Purposive, Non-
impulsive Model for Social Work Practice.” 
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Some of the greatest advances in saving lives have leveraged civilian assets, such as 
training citizens in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), providing citizen accessible and 
simple-function automatic external defibrillators, arming commercial pilots, and 
expanding fire and building codes. These strategies have prevented tragedies and reduced 
loss in the event of an incident, as in the cases of sudden cardiac arrest.  
The national response to the Dunblane, Scotland School Massacre of 1996 was 
increased legislation for gun control, which was already very strict. This option failed on 
the national level in the United States in April 2013. Strategies and policies at the local 
level are currently in effect to include school resource officers and armed volunteer 
faculty.202 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
When considering deputizing appropriate volunteer school faculty and staff and/or 
establishing a security team, the comprehensive training needed to fulfill a deputized role 
for student protection specific to active shooter resistance should fall in line with current 
LE training and response procedures. In “The Cost of Arming Schools Report,”203 data 
was gathered from “the benchmarking report of the Council of Great City Schools.”204  
The Council represents 67 of the nation’s large public school districts. To 
be eligible for membership, a district has to either enroll more than 35,000 
students or be in a school district with more than 250,000 residents. The 
members of the Council enroll 6.9 million students in 11,684 school 
                                                 
202 The national response to the Dunblane, Scotland School Massacre of 1996 was increased 
legislation for gun control, which was already very strict. This option failed on the national level in the 
United States in April 2013. Strategies and policies at the local level are currently in effect to include 
school resource officers and armed volunteer faculty in programs, such as the “Guardian” and “Sentinel” 
plans. 
203 Edward W. (Ned) Hill, “The Cost of Arming Schools: The Price of Stopping a Bad Guy with a 
Gun,” Cleveland State University, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, March 28, 2013, 
http://www.urban.csuohio.edu/publications/hill/ArmingSchools_Hill_032813.pdf. 
204 “Managing for Results in America’s Great City Schools, A Report of the Performance 
Measurement and Benchmarking Project,” October 2012, http://www.cgcs.org/cms/lib/DC00001581/ 
Centricity/Domain/81/Managing%20for%20Results_2012.pdf.  
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buildings who account for 14 percent of the nation’s public school 
students.205 
According to the “Managing for Results in America’s Great City Schools, A Report 
of the Performance Measurement and Benchmarking Project:” 
To be effective, school security staff members require specialized training. 
Thirty districts report on training for school-based law enforcement officers 
(SROs). The median number of training hours per year is 40, which is 
provided by one-third of the districts. Three districts provide more than 80 
hours of training, and another 11 between 41 and 80 hours. In sum, 24 of 
the 30 member districts that reported provide between one and two full 
workweeks of specialized training per year for their SROs. The median 
number of hours of training received by school security guards in the 42 
reporting districts was 30 hours per year. There was a much wider range of 
training provided to these security staff members than for SROs, ranging 
from a low of one hour per year to a high of 96 hours.  
Nine districts provided more than 40 hours of training, eight provided 40, 
and seven provided either 30 or 32 hours. Security guards in another seven 
districts trained between 20 and 24 hours, six districts provided either 12 or 
16 hours of training, and eight trained for less than nine hours. Since the 
Columbine high school attack of 1997, law enforcement modified their 
response policy so first in officers make entry immediately in an effort to 
neutralize the threat. This is in contrast to pre-Columbine response policies 
that preferred awaiting the arrival of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
teams prior to entering.206  
This information is from large, metropolitan schools, and not smaller jurisdictions 
with limited resources and law enforcement available. 
Without question, an onsite school resource LE officer provides protection and acts 
as a deterrent or obstacle to a would-be attacker. One critical vulnerability to uniformed 
officers functioning as SROs is their clearly displayed posture as a threat to an attacker, 
which subsequently results in their targeting as the only perceived resistance. An attacker 
familiar with a school and SROs could easily defeat these individuals with the element of 
surprise, and the fact that the SROs likely have no actionable intelligence of the attack. In 
                                                 
205 “Managing for Results in America’s Great City Schools, A Report of the Performance 
Measurement and Benchmarking Project.”  
206 Ibid. 
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the event SROs are incapacitated or killed, no other active resistance framework exists to 
operate under (generally) other than calling 911, and either “running, hiding, or fighting” 
until law enforcement arrives. Standards will need to be created to determine who will be 
accepted into this “defender” program, and they can be replicated from the existing 
minimum standards in place to select LE recruits.  
On May 22, 2013, Texas lawmakers passed House Bill 1009; that “HB 1009 creates 
a school marshal program, whose participants would only be authorized to respond to an 
active shooter or other emergency situations that threaten the lives of public school students 
on campus; they could only act before police arrived.”207 The author recommends creating 
similar legislation on the state level to address this ongoing threat considering the Marshal 
Law and Guardian Plan as models, but with an emphasis on the creation of security teams 
(NE LB 184). This recommendation is NOT a wholesale suggestion to arm school faculty 
and staff nationwide. Rather, the recommendation is the creation of a security team 
“model,” which can be tiered based upon capacity, training, resources, and concisely 
deployable.  
The Los Angeles Police Department “offers a School Safety Officer (SSO) 
program; SSOs are ‘civilian non-armed employees of the Los Angeles School Police 
Department’ that receive additional training and equipment enabling them to provide a safe 
educational environment when assigned to a school campus or other LAUSD site. 60 SSOs 
work with LASPD personnel and many go on to become police officers. Meanwhile, the 
LASPD’s Campus Police Officer program stations uniformed officers at secondary schools 
in the district.”208 A level three security team may have access to law enforcement via 
radio communication and focus specifically on passive security members as specialists 
within their domain. A level one security team, however, may have access to weapons, 
devices, and defensive measures to resist an armed, targeted attacker actively. 
                                                 
207 Alana Rocha, “School Marshal Bill Headed for Governor’s Desk,” The Texas Tribune, May 22, 
2013, http://www.texastribune.org/2013/05/22/school-marshal-bill-headed-governors-desk/. 
208 Hanover Research, Best Practices in School Security; Prepared for School XYZ (Washington, DC: 
Hanover Research, 2013), 16. 
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Targeted school violence continues to occur despite preventative efforts and 
options exist currently that have the ability to eliminate or greatly reduce the lost time 
interval of LE response to these incidents.  
The targeted school violence problem must be redefined prior to preventative 
efforts failing and an attack occurring. The problem in the event of an active attack is the 
time lost awaiting law enforcement, which is time used by the attacker to kill innocent 
victims. Strategic imagination is necessary to resist actively these attacks immediately, and 
before arrival of law enforcement, and thus, reducing lives lost. Active shooter incidents 
in American schools are generally over prior to law enforcement arrival due to this delay 
in notification and response coupled with the awareness that schools remain soft targets 
throughout the nation. A “one size fits all” policy for every educational facility in the nation 
is not possible, but options are available to most if the desire, discipline, and courage exist 
to execute these options.  
If prepared personnel are on school grounds, vetted, and trained to resist a targeted 
attacker actively, the “soft target” perception will change.  
Schools throughout America already employ staff with backgrounds in the military, 
law enforcement, or other vocations familiar with the function and responsibilities of 
possessing and using a weapon for defense. In the event staff with previous training in 
weapons and defense tactics is not available, these skills can be taught to volunteers who 
fit the criteria established by the authority having jurisdiction. School resource officers are 
widely accepted as a means to accomplish the goals of hardening schools as targets and 
protecting American students. SROs are a great safety resource, but can cause dilution in 
local LE agencies and may become financially impossible to maintain. Further, SROs are 
typically not on school grounds beyond their scheduled shift, which are typically normal 
school hours. A uniformed officer forfeits the discretion available to onsite, trained 
personnel who are unknown to anyone else in the facility beyond the directors.  
A policy model can exist to maintain a LE presence in schools, but as more of a 
supervisory role and resource available to the full-time staff assigned the responsibility of 
defending the occupants in the event of a targeted attack. The role of a SRO can evolve to 
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that of a supervisor with deputies (sentinels) operating under their supervision, and 
continuing education, training, and direction can be delivered through this single source 
hierarchal relationship. The strategic innovation of this paradigm is that current SROs will 
become teachers and current school staff will become defenders.  
This framework provides an opportunity for law enforcement and the schools to 
interoperate and train cooperatively to create a culture of seamless response through the 
community in the event of an incident.  
In smaller communities, the ability to combine resources and increase capacities is 
vital, as LE resources are very limited. Thus, LE response to an incident may be insufficient 
and initially require a longer lost time interval awaiting outlying resources. The framework 
for this policy is the opportunity for current faculty and/or staff of schools to participate in 
the defender program. Once thoroughly vetted, including background checks, drug and 
alcohol screening, physical and psychological exams, they will begin the program led by 
local law enforcement under the oversight of the local district attorney (where applicable) 
or authority having jurisdiction. 
The participants shall be considered deputies while in and around their local 
schools, and be assigned a SRO who, after initial training and certification, can manage 
several schools as needed instead of remaining static (at one location) for eight hours as a 
security guard. Training will be stringent and recurrent, and include drills with all 
participating responders, political entities, and representatives.  
Based upon the research, a multilayered approach is the best practice for addressing 
school shootings. A combination of target hardening, prevention, response protocols for 
students and staff, and thoroughly trained on-sight guardians, offers a well-rounded 
approach to maximizing safety and actively resisting the attacker until law enforcement 
arrives. “Preventing access to dedicated and committed attackers in most cases requires a 
level of security similar to a military installation, which is not feasible for most school 
settings.”209 
                                                 
209 Science and Technology Directorate, Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series Primer to 
Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings, 3–37. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Although extremely rare, the threat of an attack on a school exists throughout the 
nation, which causes fear within communities. It is the responsibility of each community 
to provide a safe and secure learning environment, as well as the ability to protect against 
any effort to cause harm. In the event of an attack on a school, the victims being caught 
unaware is typically by design and planned, which results in an uncontested response to an 
attacker in the absence of security personnel on location. When the call for help is received 
by local law enforcement, an immediate priority response results, but this call is typically 
generated by the awareness of an attack occurring. The interval between attack onset and 
LE intervention is the most critical time for the attacker to either claim lives or meet 
resistance by trained personnel prepared for such an event.  
Relationships can be developed between different domains and disciplines within 
any community to create a multidisciplinary environment of safety with the capacity to 
prevent or reduce violence. Through these relationships, a culture can be created that 
combines strategies and tactics for prevention and response to these tragedies. 
Training and response strategies can be standardized and practiced through 
scenario-based operations that will familiarize and prepare agencies and individuals for 
response to a school attack when preventive efforts fail. A culture of security can replace 
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APPENDIX B 




                                                 
210 Michael A. Fuoco, “Killer’s Handwriting Shows Picture of ‘Ticking Time Bomb,’” Pittsburg Post 
Gazette, October 5, 2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/frontpage/2006/10/05/Killer-s-handwriting-shows-
picture-of-ticking-time-bomb/stories/200610050430. 
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APPENDIX C 
The Amish school shooting timeline.211 
 
 
                                                 
211 Dumitriu, Crisis Management: The Case of School Shootings, The West Nickel Mines (Amish) School Case, 29. 
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